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ABSTRACT

Fragmented Authoritarianism and
Politics of Hydropower in China -- Case Studies of TGP & NRP

by
WONG Miu Fai Tommy
Master of Philosophy

Thanks for economic improvements since the ‘open-door policy’ in 1978;
China’s international status has been improving economically and even politically. For
instance, she has become a major contributor of BRIC which is a group of four most
rapidly developing countries in the world, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China, and the
largest buyer of U.S. treasury bonds in the world. Nevertheless, a number of intellectuals
like Liu and Shirk pointed out that there are still a number of difficulties – both
exogenous and endogenous – underneath. 1 This research would like to concentrate on
one of the aspects which Chinese investigators frequently highlighted: the hydropower
development.
This thesis will concentrate on the most controversial dam construction projects
in China – Three Gorges Project in central China and the Nu River Project in Yunnan
(hereafter abbreviate as ‘TGP’ and ‘NRP’ respectively) to examine the roles, influences
and linkages of several critical actors in midst of decision-making processes – i.e. central
leadership, provincial governments and the civil society in diverse perspectives. By
utilizing the model of ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ (hereafter abbreviate as ‘FA’)
suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal, I argue that the central leadership is still the most
critical stakeholder who determines the success or failure of mega hydropower
development projects albeit the increasing decentralization and rapid emergence of
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the recent decades after
economic liberalization of China.
Besides, the thesis would sketch out the tactics of participating and negotiations
in the policy making processes of local leaders and social organizations and explain the
apparent deliberation for hydropower development of the central authorities and the
abilities of social organizations to halt dam constructions in the latest NRP in spite of
being the most deterministic stakeholder in the polity. In the end, I would summarize
general findings and enrich the FA model to facilitate the predictability of the model
after social and economic changes associated with economic reforms.
1

Liu Guiping, “China still needs to be low profile (Zhongguo reng xu taoguang yanghui),” The United
Morning Post (Lianhe Zaobao), 7 Nov, 2009, p. 26; Also see Susan L. Shirk. China – Fragile Power. U.S.A:
Oxford University Press, 2007
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Rapid economic development in China has drawn the worldwide attention. In the
recent financial tsunami and previous financial turmoil in the late 1997, she also has
played an outstanding and dynamic role in the global economy. Yet, the economically
prosperous surface could not fully cover a series of socio-political problems.
Intellectuals and commentators -- both from overseas and domestic – have expressed
their concerns of China‘s prospects. Thanks to economic improvement since the ‗opendoor policy‘ in 1978; China‘s international status has been improving economically and
even politically. For instance, she has become a major contributor of BRIC, which is a
group of four largest developing countries in the world, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and
China, and has been the largest buyer of U.S. treasury bonds in the world. Nevertheless,
a number of intellectuals like Liu and Shirk have pointed out that there are still a number
of difficulties – both exogenous and endogenous – underneath.1 Shirk even described
that China as aggressive and autocratic when it dealt with well-publicized domestic
issues that threaten the regime2. This research would like to concentrate on one of the
issues which Chinese investigators frequently highlighted: the hydropower development.
With hydropower development, China is the top developer amongst developing
countries in the world. Implementing the advanced principle of Resettlement with
Development (RwD, also known as Developmental Resettlement, Development-oriented
Resettlement, etc.) in dam construction project enables China to gain admiration from
the World Bank 3 . Hence, numerous developing countries have followed the Chinese

1

Liu Guiping, “China still needs to be low profile (Zhongguo reng xu taoguang yanghui),” The United
Morning Post (Lianhe Zaobao), 7 Nov, 2009, p. 26; Also see Susan L. Shirk. China – Fragile Power. U.S.A:
Oxford University Press, 2007
2
Shirk, 2007: 11.
3
Brooke McDonald, Michael Webber & Duan Yuefang, “Involuntary Resettlement as an Opportunity for
Development: The Case of Urban Resettlers of the Three Gorges Project, China,” Journal of Refugee
Studies 21, no. 1 (2008): 83 &86. Tan pointed out that the World Bank had examined the Shuikou
Project and claimed it as ‘the best-practice example of properly planned and executed involuntary
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model as bailout of poverty, such as Nepal and Congo, etc4. In the mindset of elites from
developing countries, huge dams represent the modernization and technological
advancement or improvement of the countries. It is believed that the quicker dams are
being constructed, the larger and faster the revenue from generating hydroelectricity
realized5. Despite rising opposing voice to the construction of dam in the world, there is
still a perception that dam-building is a necessary construction of infrastructure for an
economy to develop 6 . Subsequently, developing countries are eager to construct
thousands of dams in their territories in the fastest pace7 . McDonald and her fellow
authors pointed out that Chinese dam builders had been involved into over 90 projects
globally and these projects are built in diverse developing countries in accordance with
Chinese model of dam construction8. Thus, the in-depth analysis in Chinese hydropower
projects could have strong predictability in the development of these facets in other
developing countries.
On the other hand, further economic growth and material prosperity of the
society is still an essential strategy for the development of China. Particularly this
concept is explained as the major channel for the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter as
the party or CCP) to consolidate the legitimacy of its administration 9. In addition, the

resettlement in the world. See: Yan Tan, Resettlement in the Three Gorges Project (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 2008), 31
4
Peter Bosshard, “Three Gorges Dam – Still China’s Model for the World?” [Internet] (Accessed 16 July
2009), (International Rivers, 5 July 2009); available from
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/blog/peter-bosshard/three-gorges-dam-%E2%80%93-stillchina%E2%80%99s-model-world .
5
Brian Richter, ‘Damming the Yangtze: Are a Few Big Hydropower Projects Better than a Lot of Small
Ones?’, Scientific American, [Internet] (accessed from 10 Nov, 2009) ,available from
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=damming-the-yangtze (13 Oct, 2009)
6
Thayer Scudder, The Future of Large Dams – Dealing with Social, environmental, Institutional and
Political Costs (London: Earthscan, 2006), 2
7
Richter, 2009
8
Kristen McDonald, Peter Bosshard & Nicole Brewer, “Exporting Dams: China’s Hydropower Industry
Goes Global”, Journal of Environmental Management 90 (2009): S294-S302.
9
“The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of CCP Rule” André Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne eds. (London:
Routledge, 2008), 8-10

2

central government actively implemented fiscal policies to stimulate domestic
consumption after the financial tsunami, so the demand for energy in China is
anticipated to skyrocket. In the 11th Five-Year-Plan, diversifying the origins of fossil
fuels and renewable energy dominated the lengthy content10. Thus, energy development
in China becomes an important issue for China studies, especially its hydropower
development. Unfortunately, the existing research has concentrated on the ‗going-out‘
strategy of the Chinese government and state-owned petroleum enterprises. Although
there are increasing literatures trying to extend to the development of renewable energy,
research about Chinese hydropower development still forms in a low proportion. Thus,
how the transformation of political and administrative contexts since the economic
reforms influences the hydro-electricity development in China is a key question for
those who would like to investigate the circumstances behind the China‘s skyrocketing
economic betterment.
Besides, when a gigantic project – no matter its scale – is on the track, thousands
of people will be affected in resettlement, construction, planning and beneficiary. Thus,
the making-decision process of projects reflects not only the effectiveness of a
government policy, but also influences thousands of, or even millions of people,
enterprises and other social actors. It is, thus, of vital importance for understanding how
the authorities mobilized and managed the dam construction and how various social
actors expressed their opinions for the projects. Hence, giant projects essentially are no
longer mere economic policies, but also reflect the power and distribution competition

10

Xinhua News Agency, CPC Proposal Urges Energy Development [Internet] , 19 October 2005, (accessed
30 November, 2009); available from http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/guideline/157456.htm
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among authorities and various stakeholders, so they are indeed arenas of political
contest11.
This thesis will concentrate on the two most controversial dam construction
projects in China – Three Gorges Project in central China and the Nu River Project in
Yunnan (hereafter abbreviated as ‗TGP‘ and ‗NRP‘ respectively) to examine the roles,
influences and linkages of several critical actors – i.e. central leadership, provincial
governments and the civil society in diverse perspectives. This enables us to have a more
comprehensive and concentrated view of totally different consequences of both projects.
In addition, this study reveals the constraints of the central leadership to implement the
next step of its economic development strategy, other than relying on bare analyses
about central-peripheral relationship or state-society relationship in China. Graph 1-1
shows the dimensions of research in this thesis. Amongst all social actors in the projects,
the central government, local governments and officials and the civil society are selected
to be the ‗apexes‘ of research and reviews. Reciprocal interactions among these three
actors would be discussed and analyzed. Conventionally, the central government was
viewed as the paramount power and authority, in particular in the classical Leninist
political system. Besides, local governments and the civil society are also the emergent
actors in the decision-making process since economic liberalization in 1978. The
leverages of mass media and international NGOs are also examined in this research.
Nevertheless, they seem not to be as significant as individual actors in the decision
making process. Subsequently, they would be discussed collaboratively with the civil
society in the chapter 5. Apart from the interactions between these three main actors (via
mass media and international NGOs as secondary players), this research will also
explain the bargaining knots of various actors. These bargaining knots reflected their
11

Ranjit Dwivedi, Conflict and Collective Action – The Sardar Sarovar Project in India (London: Routledge,
2006): 9-34.

4

perceptions of their own interests or roles in the process. The word ‗knots‘ is used
because bargaining apexes in this triangular relationship did not just include individual
units or organs, but a cluster of units or organs which have similar characteristics or
missions, although there might be a specific organ or unit ascendant in the cluster12.
Graph 1-1 – Diagram of Research Dimensions

Source: Author‘s interpretation

By utilizing the model of ‗Fragmented Authoritarianism‘ (hereafter abbreviated
as ‗FA‘) suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal to investigate the decision-making processes
of TGP and NRP, this thesis would like to tackle the following questions: Who were the
major actors in the decision-making process of these two projects? How did these actors
anticipate / exercise their own roles and the others‘ in the projects? How did they deal
with each other to fulfill their roles? How these two projects were applied to suit or
12

Kenneth Lieberthal, Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations, in
Kenneth Lieberthal & David Lampton eds. Bureaucracy, Politics , and Decision Making in Post-Mao China
(U.S.A.: University of California Press, 1992)

5

improve the FA model? And eventually, how does political administrative reform in
China contribute to the development of hydropower in China? In order to address these
questions, data aim to construct arguments in the dissertation are collected from a wide
range of Chinese or English literature, including scholarly journal articles, books related
to Chinese bureaucracy or hydropower in China or other developing countries; and news
articles accessed from either internet or credible posts in the world, such as the New
York Times, Washington Post, etc13. In addition, the research will be conducted in the
qualitative historical and comparative approach with the case studies of the Three
Gorges Project and Nu River Project. The literature about their construction would be
analyzed, using the theoretical framework of FA model.
In the past, researches about central-peripheral relationships concentrated on the
correlation of decentralization and economic reform via either particular economic
indicators, such as fiscal flows, capital flows, etc; or the development in the coastal
region 14 . However, findings from these two approaches could not be adapted to the
inward shift in the focus of development in the 21st century. Additionally, these
approaches could not deal with the cross-provincial and cross-agencies‘ nature of dam
construction. The details of decentralization would be discussed in the following section.

13

The limitations of collecting data from reviewing literature should be mentioned herein. Due to the
launch of ‘guiding public opinion’ campaign of the CCP during the decision making period of the TGP
and the prohibition of entering reservoir areas of the Three Gorges Dam to conduct academic
research, according to the Chinese Laws, data provided by Chinese literature was biased and
unreliable, especially those related to TGP. Besides, because a number of unregistered ENGOs who
have contributed a lot of efforts in suspending the NRP relied on internet and blogs to issue news and
information, the reliability of data was in a certain degree questioned. Thus, English literature will
share a greater proportion of reference so as to maintain the reliability of data.
14
For example, in the book edited by David Goodman and published in 1997 by Routledge, Hainan,
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai and Zhejiang were chosen to be investigated; besides, Guangdong,
Anhui, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Tianjin and Jiangxi in the books edited by Kendrischke and Feng and
Fitzgerald respectively. See: David Goodman ed. China’s Provinces in Reform – Class, Community and
Political Culture (London: Routhledge, 1997); Hans Hendrischke & Feng Chongyi eds. The Political
Economy of China’s Provinces (London: Routledge, 1999)
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Unfortunately, the project-based research, or more precisely, having the research
concentrating on and contrasting precisely two projects, might be argued to have limited
applications for other aspects beyond the hydropower industry. In addition, the selection
of specific couple of projects might be argued to degrade the ‗representativeness‘ of the
thesis. However, they are selected amongst a variety of dam construction projects in
China because of their uniqueness and high representativeness. These two projects
characterize the two critical stages of transformation of policy making in contemporary
China. The determination of enforcing the TGP reflected features of transformation in
policy making around the June-Fourth massacre in 1989. The unprecedented large scale
of construction and resettlement in the project is the reason why the project drew the
worldwide controversy, other than the autocratic stance of the central authority. Despite
the centre‘s autocracy, the bargaining postures of ministries and provinces could not
thereby be ruled out. On the other hand, the NRP, to some extent, is less renowned, but
this does not mean that it is less disputable and important. The fierce controversy was
amplified by active lobbying of ENGOs

(Environmental Non-Governmental

Organizations), INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) and the mass
media‘s cooperation. This indicates the emergence of other actors beyond the party state
in contemporary China. Besides, the procedures of policy formulation of NRP are
different from that of the TGP. In investigating in and contrasting these projects, it is not
difficult to discover that the central leadership, provincial governments and NGOs had
frequent interactions and influences to each other. Nonetheless, other projects, such as
Sanmenxia Project in Yellow River and the Mekong River Project, which provoked
equally high controversies might incur diplomatic variances. For instance, the
Sanxiamen Project was largely influenced to the development of Sino-Soviet intimacy in
the 1950s and the Mekong Project was suspended since the littoral countries in S.E. Asia,
7

like Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, opposed to the project jointly. This research aims to
study the leverages of political transformation and the development of domestic hydropolitics in China, so diplomatic variance should be effectively eliminated. Thus, the
cases of TGP and NRP were picked for study to have a deeper and more comprehensive
understanding of hydroelectricity development in China. From these two projects, we
could further understand the constraints of China to develop its interior region as well as
its hydropower potential. The implications of findings in this research for other projects,
or even in other energy policies, should depend on other follow-up researches.
“Fragmented Authoritarianism” model and Chinese bureaucratic
transformation
Table 1-2 – Type of Centre-Province Linkages and Directions of Flow

Pre-reform Period
Centre
(Up-Down)

Provinces
(Bottomup)

 Ideological introduction
 Coercion

Reform Period
 Control over leadership
selection

 Command Approach

 Control over interest
articulation

 Patron-Client relations

 Merit-based recruitment

 Mass Mobilization

 Interest re-distribution

 Conflict Nationalization

 Conflict Localization

Administrativ
e

Political

Administrative

 Policy
Implementa
tion

 Pleading

 Policy
Implementat
 Persuasion
ion

 Support

 Communica
tions

 Patronclient
relations

 Opposition

8

 Communicat
ions

Political

 Propositions

Source: Cited from Table 3.1 in Zheng, 1995, 86

With reference to the history of the PRC since its establishment, the process of
Chinese bureaucratic system transforming could basically be delineated into two periods
with the death of Mao. Features of bureaucratic system were shown on Table 1-2. The
bureaucratic system in China was generally perceived as totalitarian model during the
Mao‘s period and the system could be summarized as the following features: mighty
central leadership, ideological mobilization, high conformity of localities, and nationwide unitary, as well as comprehensive involvement of the central government. In this
period, the central leadership actively involved itself in, and even dominated, the
decision-making process and local governments were just its agents in following central
commands with absolute conformity. Central commands would be legitimatized,
justified and promoted ideologically. Authorities and people were mobilized to actualize
the visions promoted in the ideologies without allowing any opposition15. For instance,
‗Taking steel as the key link‘ (yi gang wei gang) and ‗Surpass the UK and overwhelm
the US‘ (chao ying gan mei)16 were major slogans and ideologies promoted in the period
of Great Leap Forward. Localities and individuals subsequently committed themselves
to exploiting steel resources and heavy industries for radical industrialization.
The death of Mao means the PRC has entered a new era of economic
development, as well as political transformation. The central leadership under Deng‘s
instruction mobilized provincial governments to develop a new economic role to achieve
high economic growth17. Additionally, through decentralization and empowerment of
provincial governments, the provincial leaders would have greater autonomy to develop
15

David Goodman, ‘The Politics of Regionalism: Economic Development, Conflict and Negotiation’ in
David Goodman and Gerald Segal eds. China Deconstructs – Politics, Trader and Regionalism (London:
Routhledge, 1994), 7-8; Yang Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China – Challenges from Below
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 5-6.
16
Translated by author
17
Janice L. Caulfield, ‘Local Government Reform in China: a Rational Actor Perspective’, International
Review of Administrative Sciences 72, no.2 (2006):254-255.

9

domestic economies. Consequently, there would be more interest clashes for provincial
leaders to follow central instructions while fighting to maximize interests of provinces
with regards to policies that reinforce economic growth18. Subsequently, it was generally
agreed that the hierarchy had been pluralized and fractionalized. In her article, Caulfield
summarized a series of decentralization reforms into three dimensions. They are:
marketization, fiscal reforms and management and administrative reforms 19. In essence,
these decentralization reforms on the one hand could canvass support for economic
reform from provincial leaders, while on the other hand, they could empower provincial
governments to formulate tailor-made strategies for economic development

20

.

Nevertheless, Oksenberg sketched out the structure of the contemporary Chinese
hierarchy and agreed that in spite of it being more fragmented, the core of hierarchy is
still under the Soviet-Leninist style 21 . Thus, he concluded that no transformation has
occurred systematically and the leadership might not have comprehensive planning and
dimension for political reforms 22 . The philosophy of ‗crossing the river by touching
stones‘ is not only suitable for illustrating economic reform, but also political
transformation as well23.
Although decentralization contributed to the anxiety of political disintegration
and the emergence of provincial protectionism, the necessity of decentralization for
economic development could not be refuted24. Decentralization brings space for local
governments to have a more prominent role in policy making processes than before.
18

John Donaldson, ‘Provinces: Paradoxical Politics, Problematic Partners’ in Chung Jae Ho & Lam TaoChiu eds. China’s Local Administration – Traditions and Changes in the Sub-national Hierarchy (London:
Routledge, 2009):27.
19
Caulfield, 2006: 258.
20
Donaldson, 2009: 27.
21
Michel Oksenberg, ‘China’s Political System: Challenges of Twenty-First Century’, The China Journal,
no.45 (January 2001), 25.
22
Ibid, 28.
23
Ibid, 35.
24
Yang, 2003, 4-5
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Pessimists have argued that economic decentralization would prompt the centrifugalism
of provinces, in particular in the 1980s, since provincial cadres committed themselves to
develop their paddocks for self-sufficiency and imposed protectionist measures on interprovincial trade. Each province acted like an individual actor and neglected the central
authority. This phenomenon was known as ‗dukedom economies‘ or ‗provincialism‘ 25.
There was doubt that China might follow the path of USSR in going to collapse and
separation26. However, Goodman criticized the intellectual weaknesses of the causation
of economic decentralization and political disintegration. He countered with historicalcomparative approach and pointed out that the ethnic diffusion in China was much more
‗homogenous‘ than Soviet Union. Furthermore, the most critical point is that the central
leadership would still be holding the leading role in economic development, rather than
the provincial cadres, despite power delegation27. As a consequence, the causation of
economic decentralization and political disintegration are logically weak.
The FA model is one of the models to illustrate the segmentation of authority in
accordance with the functions of administrative organs and was proposed for explaining
how economic policies are influenced by the bureaucratic structures of the Chinese
government, rather than other issues. It illustrated the complexity of bureaucratic system
of China in the 1980s and pointed out that economic decentralization fundamentally
changed the bureaucratic system of China. The model claimed that negotiations among
organs acted significantly in policy making. After the enrichment from Mertha, the FA
model portrayed the triangular relationship between the central leadership, the provincial
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bureaucratic units as well as the civil society, and explained how this triangular
relationship influences economic policies.
Prior to his writing in 1992 in which he modified his thesis on the fragmentation
of the Chinese bureaucracy, Kenneth Lieberthal, with Michel Oksenberg, combined the
rationality model and the power model to analyze the segmentation in the central
leadership. Besides, Lieberthal extended the scope of his pluralism arguments to lower
hierarchal levels. He argued that ‗authority below the very peak of the Chinese political
system is fragmented and disjointed‘. 28 The model asserted that authorities are divided
into several ‗clusters‘ based on their policy interests and modified the extent of
segmentation of the authority. To achieve or retain their policy interests becomes the
dynamics of officials expressing their opinions and stances. Thus, consensus seeking
amongst ministries and commissions is the central process or core rationale in the
decision making of China29. He claimed that clusters of governmental organs could be
classified into vertical lines (tiao) and horizontal lines (kuai) of hierarchy. Vertically,
organs would gather with similar functions and jobs; horizontally, on the contrary, they
would perceive others at the same level but with different functions in a sort of nonbinding ‗professional relationship‘30. In effect, the economic reform and decentralization
stressed horizontal line of authority rather than vertical line, which was described as
‗ making tiao serve kuai‘ in Chinese31. Under this backdrop, decisions were achieved by
‗an enormous amount of discussion and bargaining among officials to bring the right
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people on board.32‘ Lieberthal further pointed out that the fragmented authoritarianism
would provide more opportunities for actors to thwart important policies from adoption
and enforcement33.
In the model, bureaucratic units and localities are important actors. The structural
and functional divisions of authority among bureaucracies are critical elements. In
additional to the influence of the ranking system of the bureaucracy, it leads to the
inevitability of seeking consensus and achieving agreement among different ‗clusters‘ of
ministries34. The model pointed out that the bargaining which incurred in the consensusseeking process could influence the formulation and implementation of policy, as well as
the effectiveness of the policy 35 . This is the trend of the authority of provincial
governments having expanded. Their de facto authority was even discovered to be much
greater than what are authorized in the constitution36. For example, J.S.Migdal stressed
that
‗the state‘s capacity to develop the economy depends
not only on the will and skills of the top leadership,
but also on the lower level governments and state
organizations……[W]ithout the cooperation of low
level governments, the state leaders could hardly get
their job done or ―get people in the society to do what
they want to do‘.37
Besides, whether the relationships of units are symmetric and units‘ orientations in the
bureaucracy would influence their behaviors and activities in amplifying their interests38.
It is not difficult to discover that the market orientation of liberal economics has

32

Lieberthal. 1995: 173.
Ibid: 170.
34
Lieberthal, 1992, 8
35
Ibid, 10
36
Zheng Yongnian, Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism, and Economic Growth: the Making of
Semi-Federalism in Reform China. (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1995),7
37
Joel S. Migdal, Strong, Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the
Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); cited in Ibid, 5.
38
Lieberthal, 1992, 10
33

13

penetrated in the polity. Thus, the FA argued that ministers and organizations lobby and
amplify their interest and power on the basis of market-oriented-rational analysis39.
Notwithstanding the segmented nature of the bureaucracy, the authority of
central leadership, which is still one of critical actors in the model, could not be
underestimated. With reference to Lieberthal‘s explanation, the responsibility of the
central leadership is to resolve any contests existing in the lengthy negotiations and
discussions. Lieberthal and Oksenberg emphasized that the authority of central
leadership is of vital importance and claimed that
‗policy is the aggregate response of leaders or factions
to problems they perceive and this response reflect the
relative power of the participants, their strategies for
advancing their beliefs and political interests, and
their differentiated understanding of the problem at
hand‘40.
Besides, the central leadership also possessed the right of framing normative principles
of policies, so ideologies and slogans were widely used to facilitate the transfer of
wisdoms and visions of the central leadership to the lower level and to enhance the
centre‘s coordination41. When a policy was decided to be implemented, the lower-level
agencies in the hierarchical system would be responsible for implementing the decisions
of the centre and cooperating with others. Conversely, the reforms contributed to the
declining utilization of ideologies and the elimination of the centre‘s power in providing
normative motivations42. On the other hand, the strong influences of central leadership
do not mean that the current leadership could have totalitarian authority that their
famous predecessors like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping possessed. Due to the
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economic liberalization, the personal charisma and dictatorship would no longer be
effective to direct the bureaucracy or implementing the policy. The leadership is less
personalized and the power is less centralized than before. However, the central
government is still powerful because it directs the general blueprint and dimension of
economic reforms. Besides, the central government would also act as capital and
information providers. The specific arrangements had been left to provincial
governments so as to adapt the diverse situations among provinces43. In the cases of
TGP and NRP, it is not difficult to discover that how the central leadership valued or
gave priorities to a project is a vital element in determining its success or failure.
Further, Lieberthal highlighted the difficulties of possessing actual and practical
local information for the centre in this massive and segmented authoritarian system 44. It
provided ample room for intermediate organs, i.e. provincial governments, to expand
their leverage in the policy making process. These would most likely accelerate the
bureaucratic flaws beyond the central level 45 . Thus, the decision making process in
China becomes more complicated and fragmented.
To have a short sum up, Lieberthal suggested the FA model to modify and
portray the circumstances of the policy making process in China, highlighting the topdown approach. While affirming the mightiness of the central leadership, the FA model
revealed a number of limitations that the central leadership encountered and flaws in the
Chinese bureaucratic system. Unfortunately, the contentions of Lieberthal were based on
his observations and insight into the initial stages of economic reform. Therefore, the
continuing applicability of the FA model was questioned and there was a need to explain
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and illustrate the status quo after further and deeper decentralization and administrative
reforms in the late 1990s. This was in addition to the successful personnel succession in
the 9th and 10th National People‘s Congress in 1998 and 2003 respectively. Alternatively,
Lieberthal‘s suggestion was criticized as being unable to explain the dynamics of
political transformation in the fragmented bureaucratic system. Subsequently, the
contribution of the FA model seems to be limited to illustrating the situations, but its
explicability seems to be limited 46. For instance, Mertha criticized Lieberthal‘s model as
failing to explain the larger policy, such as the ‗Open up the West‘ Campaign, seeing
that it seemed to be ‗obsolescen[t]‘ 47 . Critics argued that the FA model could only
explain the features of a stage of administrative evolution since the economic reform and
the evolution has been entering into another stage, which Lema and Ruby have
portrayed the new stage as a stage of ‗policy coordination‘. Contrary to Lieberthal‘s
argument, they presumed that the current policy making in China should have developed
an underlying consensus amongst ministers which differs from the anarchy-liked
incremental phase48. Unfortunately, they failed to modify the characteristics of policy
making in the stage of policy coordination. If their arguments were deeply analyzed,
they could only revise the FA model, but could not refute it. Then, their delineation of
stages in policy coordination and fragmented authoritarianism is not significant because
the major difference is the degree of power and resources competitions among agencies.
Moreover, the existence of consensus is due to the involvement and directional guidance
from the centre. The role of centre as the coordinator who balances and buffers the
interests of competing agencies had already been mentioned in the article written by
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Lieberthal several years before49. As a consequence, their contribution did not contradict
against the FA model, but have enriched the arguments of Lieberthal. The FA model
seems to be qualified to describe the bureaucratic system of China.
Mertha’s addition and modification
In order to deal with Lieberthal‘s limitations, Mertha enriched the content of the
FA model with the aid of notions of ‗policy entrepreneurship‘ and ‗coalitions‘. Although
these two notions mainly referred to the backdrop of democratic systems, Mertha
claimed that the context of fragmented authoritarianism had been able to ‗provide a
fertile context‘ for applying these two notions to explain the extension of the scope of
segmentation in the Chinese bureaucratic system

50

. Thus, some individuals in

government agencies were prominently committed to reshaping the policy formulation.
Mertha described these individuals as ‗policy entrepreneurs‘; this characterized the
strong willingness of committing resources and efforts to altering or shaping the forms
or consequences of policies that they were concerned with the most 51 . Mintrom and
Vergari summarized the functions of policy entrepreneurs, including: (1) discovering
alternative and creative methods or channels to amplify their issues or arguments; (2)
willingness to bear a certain degree of risks while being involved in striving for goals
with uncertain consequences; (3) coordinating, managing, and utilizing resources and
networks so as to tackle various problems associated with collective actions 52. Mertha
added that the notion of policy entrepreneurship could explain the correlation between
the existence of policy change and bargaining amongst agencies. He also argued that the
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main sources of policy entrepreneurs could be identified from officials, social activists,
and the media53.
Besides, he applied the concept of ‗coalitions‘ complementarily so as to explain
the policy change in the FA model. Mertha recognized the forming of coalitions as the
strategy of policy entrepreneurs to expand their own influences and political sphere54.
Thus, individuals or agencies from diverse positions or backgrounds, but with a shared
belief system, might be willing to coordinate and commit in collective activities over
time; with such cohesion known as ‗advocacy coalitions‘ 55 . Mintorm and Vergari
claimed that short-term self-interests amongst agencies could not effectively form
coalitions due to the lack of a common belief system56.
Therefore, due to the segmented nature of the Chinese bureaucratic system that
the FA model presented, Mertha further added policy entrepreneurship‘ and ‗coalitions‘
to illustrate how bureaucratic organs and activists in society can fight for and lobby their
agenda, as well as contend or cooperate with others. He described that,
‗……the political dynamics captured in the
fragmented authoritarianism framework provide
policy entrepreneurs with a road map, a playbook
by which they can pursue their policy goals. They
adopt the strategies that traditional institutions
have used for decades to pursue their agendas and
institutional mandates57.‘
In other words, without refuting the arguments and contentions of Lieberthal‘s FA
model, Mertha discovered the drawbacks of the model and added the notions of ‗policy
entrepreneurship‘ and ‗coalition‘, as well as including emergent civil society into the
consideration of the policy making process, so as to reinforce the explicability of the
53
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model in the aspect of dynamic political changes. Indeed, Mertha‘s addition is an
appropriate response to large-scale administrative reforms in 1998, especially through
the enhancement of contributions for policy making in the civil society. He further
explains that ‗the increasing levels of inclusion at some point reach a tipping point in
which an ever-growing corporatist system begins to resemble a broader heterogeneous
system of competing interests for parts of the policy pie 58.‘
Nevertheless, because of rapid social change in China after economic
liberalization, the functions of bureaucracy had been seriously constrained. There exists
a rising trend in the occurrence of social protests throughout different parts of China. A
number of scholars, observers and commentators have contributed in this aspect to study
this rising trend. So did Mertha, and he noticed and extended the scope of the theoretical
framework of fragmented authoritarianism. He argued that the model should include
more actors -- such as intellectuals, individual activists and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) -- in the framework so as to adapt it to the rapid change in the
political and social environment of China 59 . He pointed out the weaknesses of
bureaucratic units in responding to the enormous necessity in a rapidly changed society
in which interest groups and citizens are much more aggressive in fighting for their own
interests than before60. NGOs are regarded as filling this gap. They act as supplementary,
rather than hostile, to the authority like their western counterparts61. For example, they
could absorb the officials dismissed from the restructuring of the government in 1998 62.
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Subsequently, it is necessary to include in the consideration of policy making in these
two projects in the perspective of social organizations.
In short, the fragmented authoritarianism, according to Lieberthal, is a model to
study the bargaining within the bureaucracy, in which how the central leadership,
provincial governments and functional ‗clusters‘ of ministries negotiate with each other
so as to fight for their own interests and fulfill their roles. However, the generalization of
the model was challenged, particularly after the June-Fourth Massacre in 198963. The
limitations seem to be tackled by Mertha to add the emergent civil society into the
investigation and to include the notion of ‗coalitions‘ and ‗policy entrepreneurship‘ to
enrich the content of the FA model. This thesis further modified Mertha‘s contribution
via the research dimension of bargaining triangle mentioned in above. As a result, this
thesis could explain the reasons for the transformation of the dynamic of policy
formulation, beyond to illustrate the rationales.
NGO development and the FA model
Prior to this thesis, there are numerous contributions on state-society
relationships in China. Especially after a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe,
whether China would follow her western communist counterparts to have rapid
development in democratization stirred up by the civil society has been discussed for
years. Due to the economic liberalization, the Chinese civil society has been
transformed. It is no longer simple corporatist who gives a hand to promote state
interests and policies. Morton described that ‗Chinese civil society is therefore best
understood as a mix of state-sponsored social control and spontaneous grassroots

63

Andrew Mertha, Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process.
[Internet] paper presented at the annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1
September 2007 (accessed on 16 November 2009); available from
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/am847/pdf/FA_2.0.1.pdf.

20

activity‘ 64 . In effect, it is impossible to completely neglect the existence of state
intervention in the civil society in China.
Schwartz also noticed the transformation of the state-society relationship. He
reviewed the development history of ENGOs, the most successful NGOs in China, in the
post-Mao period and tried to answer whether Chinese ENGOs could act supplementarily
to the state in dealing with the environmental challenges or could strike the state just like
their Eastern European counterparts. Two portrayals of scenarios in China were
generalized: With the aids of Graph 1-3, he stated the conception of ‗corporatism‘. This
concept portrayed the political space of ENGOs as being occupied by the state because
of the authoritarian nature of PRC. Under the assumption of conventional Confucian
education, Chinese NGOs prefer to respect the authority of the state, rather than
challenge it. Notwithstanding the rising roles and contribution of NGOs, they would not
be willing to be hostile against the state. As a result, to maintain the balance between the
state and the civil society, there would be a longer time to have a persistent negotiation65.
Graph 1-3 – Political Space of ENGOs Occupied by the State and Society

Source: Figure 1 in Schwartz, 2008:.69

Nevertheless, the situation has been questioned because of decentralization and
intensive emphasis on economic development accompanied by the economic reforms.
For instance, Liu has argued that political injustice or uneven distribution of political
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privileges makes people to accumulate their discontent against the authorities. This
discontent from society is believed to be the major dynamic pushing the emergence of
civil society of China. He uncovered two incompatible logical mindsets between
Chinese civilian and elite. This contradiction probably deteriorates the situation of the
communist regime. As a result, the Chinese authorities are ‗sitting on a powder keg‘ 66.
Schwartz has another description which pictures ENGOs functioned as a dual role based
on this circumstance. Due to the failure of the state to fully implement policies to
achieve diverse goals in a range of aspects and to fulfill the public‘s expectation
accurately, NGOs supported the state to achieve the goals of specific issues, like
environment protection, and participated actively in broadening the political space
through taking up a part of state‘s responsibilities67.
Graph 1-4 – Political Space of ENGOs in the Public Sphere and State’s Delegation

Source: Figure 2 in Schwartz, 2008: p.70

Thus seen, the state-society relationship is different. The roles of NGOs are more
aggressive and a pattern of confronting the state seems to exist (see Graph 1-4). He
concluded that ‗[a]lthough the process may still be in its infancy, Chinese society seems
to be following a more confrontational path, expanding its role and moving in the
direction of challenging the state‘68.
Similarly, Ho argued that the ENGOs in China are not fully confronting the state.
He suggested the terminology of ‗embedded social activism‘ to portray the party-society
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relationship. In the semi-authoritarian context, ENGOs are engaged to participate in the
decision-making process, but nevertheless, the room of participation was acquiesced to
by the party-state. The party-state had the experience of clamping down on civil groups
without any hesitation. As a result, activists and ENGOs would try to stay in the
acceptable areas in which the party-state would tolerate69. He said,
‗Chinese green activists profess a ―female
mildness‖ – a greening without conflict,
environmentalism at a safe distance from direct
political action…Green social organizations are
increasingly courting government favor in the hope
of influencing policy-making, and they avoid
potentially dangerous confrontation with the state‘70.
In contrast to Schwartz‘s argument, Ho stressed on the interactions of the civil society
and the state. He thought that the current development of civil society in China is the
consequence of ‗self-filtering‘ of social organizations and ‗self-awakening‘ of the
authorities 71 . In other words, it is shaped by the informal consensus and interactive
coordination between the party-state and civil society.
In sum, the ENGOs in China have a relatively open and free room for them to
lobby their interests. In addition, they have more functions than before as they do not
only act as supplementary to, but also complementary to, the state. The function of
‗check-and-balance‘ is much more obvious than before 72. Their operations have been
more independent from the authority. Besides, regardless of which mode of the ENGOs
are adopting to deal with their correlation with the party state, their influences of policy
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making could no longer be neglected. In an interview, Mertha has commented that
‗[f]ifteen years ago, opponents of large-scale dam projects in China were greeted with
indifference or repression. Today they are a part of the hydropower policy-making
process itself‘ 73. Wong & Chan pointed out that the party-state and the civil society are
inter-influential. They help each other to transform and accommodate 74, but how much
they thereby pressure the authorities in the aspect of policy implementation is a question
addressed in this dissertation. Mertha employed the notions of ‗policy entrepreneurship‘
and ‗issue framing‘ to enrich the content of FA model so as to adopt changes and
maintain explicability of the model. Admittedly, Mertha‘s enrichment could effectively
tackle the weaknesses of the model of neglecting the significance of social organizations
and explain how organizations influenced the policy making. However, it overlooked the
importance of the perception of actors in policy making and failed to picture the
transformation of policy making process in China. As a result, this thesis did not only
include social organizations in policy making process, but also adopted an interactive
approach to analyze the success and failure of the TGP and NRP respectively so as to
generalize the transformation of policy making process in reform period and show how
the FA model could be employed to explain the policy making in China.

Structure of Thesis
The thesis consists of six chapters. In this chapter, the model of fragmented
authoritarianism is discussed. Apart from the vast bureaucracy in China, the civil society,
or more accurately the ENGOs, should be considered as important actors in the decisionmaking process of hydropower development. Besides, by reviewing a series of
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literatures about Chinese bureaucratic system and civil society, the status quo in these
respects could be briefly understood.
In chapter 2, the history of hydropower development of China is investigated.
Why is dam construction important to Chinese economic development? This question
would be addressed in this chapter. In addition, TGP and NRP would be highlighted and
their importance would be stated. On the other hand, the history and rationale of
economic decentralization would be embodied in this chapter. This arrangement would
on the one hand be able to set forth the context of projects, on the other hand be able to
provide a solid ground for analysis.
Chapter 3 is the starting point for discussing the respective bargaining with local
administrations and ENGOs of the central government. The rationales of the distinct
responses and values of the central authority in these two projects would be explained
here. The implicit meanings of these two projects for leadership would thereby be
inferred. Thus, how the central government, including both the central leadership and the
central authorities, will be illustrated. The results of NRP and TGP will be explained in
the central perspective.
After that, another bargaining node in the triangular relationship suggested in
chapter 1 would be concentrated. The roles, interests of local governments would be
discussed in chapter 4. Beyond local governments themselves, the interactions with the
centre and ENGOs in local governments‘ perspective would also be reflected. Why were
local senior cadres so enthusiastic about constructing dams in their paddocks? And how
did they value the TGP and NRP respectively? All these questions would be answered in
this chapter.
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In chapter 5, the civil society and its bargaining node with the state would be
analyzed. How the ENGOs penetrated their influences into the decision-making process
of these two projects and why this existed would be expounded. It would be argued that
how the domestic ENGOs allied with its international counterparts to achieve their goals
in the NRP which they were prohibited doing so in the TGP, would clarify the roles of
foreign activists.
Finally, a full picture of analysis would be indicated in the chapter 6, which is the
conclusion chapter of the thesis. Apart from answering the questions concerning the
fragmented authoritarianism model, general findings would be summarized and utilized
to argue that the refined FA model is still applicable in China. Besides, findings in the
research could help clarify the essence and features of the Chinese political landscape.
Implications of general findings would enable us to forecast the weaknesses and
limitations of China in its efforts to develop its hydropower. The most decisive question
of determining the success of dam construction in China is whether the central
leadership is willing to take up the role of driver, or just a coordinator, in the project.
The priorities assigned to the projects and pressures arising from their execution would
be the most determining factors in influencing the decision of leadership to answer this
question.
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Chapter 2 – Hydropower Development in China
In the previous chapter, the objectives of this thesis were briefly introduced. The
significance of this research basically relied on China‘s rapid economic development in
the late 20th century. When China has been further urbanized, industrialized and
modernized, power supply would become one of the most critical problems that the
government needs to deal with. In this chapter, the history of hydropower development
in China would be discussed, in particular the history after the establishment of the PRC
and economic liberalization. Additionally, why Chinese government seems to emphasize
the necessity of hydropower development would be discussed. Via qualitative and
quantitative data, this chapter would demonstrate that hydropower development is not a
mere economic decision, but essentially a political decision. Through large-scale dam
construction, the CCP could effectively consolidate its legitimacy. Apart from
discussing the significance of hydropower development in a historical approach, the
background of TGP and NRP were introduced respectively so as to provide empirical
ground for analyses and arguments in the following chapters. In the modern world, water
resources management does not only concern the passive sense of preventing natural
crises, say flooding or drought, but also require functioning in an active sense of
generating electricity. For example, the two cases studied in this thesis – the TGP &
NRP – were constructed for both passive and active senses. In this chapter, the active
sense of large-scale dam construction projects will be focused upon after the functions of
these projects were introduced. Besides, incidents in the decision making processes of
the TGP and NRP will also be briefly reviewed so as to present a rough overview of
hydropower

development

in China

before

transformation in the decision-making processes.
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conducting

in-depth analysis

of

As one of the countries with the longest history in the world, China‘s fate seems
to be closely tied with water resources management. It is not only because of the vast
size of the Chinese population, but also the Confucian tradition. In the feudal period, the
absolute majority of the population was peasantry. Stable access for water resources was
extremely critical to maintaining their livelihood. Their political satisfaction for leaders
and regimes was largely related to stable harvests and livelihood. Additionally, the
absolute power of feudal Chinese emperors was derived from the Heaven‘s mandate, so
flooding, drought and earthquakes were believed to be indicators of distrust from
Heaven. As such, successful water resources management could determine sustainability
and decay of empires and dynasties. It has profound political significance, rather than
mere economic significance, in China 75. This concept seems to have been retained while
time passes. Beyond ordinary people, the leadership of PRC is even more likely to
uphold this conception. Subsequently, the Chinese people have praised large dams as
effective and contributing tools of development by political elite 76 . Furthermore,
Leninist ideologies highly praised dam construction as the tool of defeating nature by
humanity in ideological sense 77 . As a result, Mao Zedong, as the loyal follower of
Leninism, stressed and even implemented a series of dam construction projects within
several years in spite of the severe poverty and famine in China, particularly during the
Great Leap Forward period. Unfortunately, the furious speed of construction was
associated with the detrimental quality of dams and inexpiable loss of life and properties.
One of the best illustrations is the Sanmenxia Project at Yellow River. This project was
approved in 1957 and completed in 1960. It was a symbol of Sino-Soviet intimacy in the
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1950s since it was designed by Soviet experts. Nevertheless, the dam had seriously
suffered by the problem of extensive sand sedimentations. All functions of the dam,
including hydroelectricity generation, were completely suspended and a huge area in the
upstream to became inundated.

Eventually, the dam was practically abandoned 78 .

According to Jasper, approximately 3500 dams collapsed and more than 33,000 dams
were at the edge of collapse 79 . Notwithstanding deep remorse from previous dam
construction efforts; the Chinese leadership did not eliminate its fascination for mega
hydropower projects; on the contrary, the appetite for energy because of industrialization
further stimulated its determination to encourage hydropower development.
Indeed, the political value of dam construction in the mindset of elite should
never thereby be underestimated. On the contrary, the multi-functional nature of dam
construction projects further justifies the necessity of these projects for the political elite,
particularly due to the economic value in generating hydroelectricity. For example, the
central leaders frequently emphasized that the TGP was designed for at least three
functions – electricity generation, flooding prevention and navigation80, to underpin its
necessity. Notwithstanding the multi-functional nature of modern dam construction,
hydroelectricity generation would be stressed in this research. Quantitative data indicates
that why hydroelectricity generation is the most noteworthy factor in contemporary
Chinese dam construction. In absolute term, the amount of hydroelectricity consumption
since ‗Open-door‘ policy in China is shown in Chart 2.1. It is not difficult to discover
that the amount of hydroelectricity consumed in China steadily escalates. More than 100
million tonnes oil equivalent hydroelectricity was consumed annually. In addition, the
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pace of growth has accelerated to have no less than 8% growth per annum after entering
the new century81. In order to further reflect the significance of hydroelectricity to the
worldwide – in particular Chinese – economic development, the shares of
hydroelectricity for total primary energy consumed in the world and China are
calculated and contrasted in the Chart 2.2. The chart reflects the fact that the significance
of hydroelectricity for energy consumption has been increasingly reinforced in China. In
the initial stage of economic reform, the percentage of hydroelectricity to primary
energy consumption was slightly higher at 2%, but the share could have caught up with
the global level recently, i.e. at more than 6%.
Chart 2.1 – Hydroelectricity Consumption in China, 1978-2008

Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy -- June 2009

Both chart 2.1 and 2.2 could prove the high value and importance of
hydroelectricity for China on the demand side. They indicate that hydroelectricity
becomes another significant energy source beyond conventional hydrocarbon thermal in
81
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both absolute and relative terms. Apparently, rapid industrialization and urbanization
after economic reform demanded greater consumption of electricity. Besides, the charts
reflect that the pace of utilization of hydroelectricity could not catch up with the growth
of national energy demand in China. The absolute amount of hydroelectricity
consumption start to increase sharply between 2003 and 2008 approximately twofold,
but the share of hydroelectricity to primary energy consumption remained around 5.56% in this period, which is slightly lower than the global average level. Thus, despite the
rapid development, hydroelectricity seems not to be sufficient in meeting the national
electricity demand. Subsequently, hydroelectricity could not fully replace conventional
fossil fuels to become the largest energy source of China in spite of intensive
development since the establishment of the ‗open-door‘ policy.
Chart 2.2 – Share of Hydroelectricity to Primary Energy Consumption in the
World & China, 1978-2008

Source: Calculated by author; Data from BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy -- June 2009

On the supply side, Chart 2.3 shows the composition of electricity generation in
China between 1987 and 2007. There is no doubt about the skyrocketing of electricity
generation in China and the conventional thermal is apparently the largest source of
electricity throughout the statistical period. Moreover, the share of conventional thermal
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does not have any trend of deterioration. In contrast, hydroelectricity has a narrower gap
in the chart, but the share is reinforcing and the gap is widening. Thus, hydroelectricity
plays a more significant role of electricity generation in the contemporary China.
Data in above reflects the considerable economic values of dam construction and
developing hydroelectricity in both demand and supply senses. Rapid economic and
social modernization since the late 1970s did not mitigate but did stimulate the demand
for dam construction and hydroelectricity development. Thus, the Chinese government
approved and gave high priority to expanding power projects after the conservative
power shortages in 2003 and 200482.
Chart 2.3 – China’s Electricity Generation by Type, 1987-2007

Source: EIA, Energy Information Administration -- Country Analysis Brief (Updated in July 2009),
[Internet] (assessed on 17 December 2009), available on http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/pdf.pdf

Apart from the ideological and economic considerations that hydroelectricity
brings, dam construction projects are also justified by its contribution to energy security.
According to the United Nations, the official definition of ‗energy security‘ is the
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persistent and adequate availability of energy at affordable prices 83 . Nevertheless,
different states have their diverse emphases on this definition because of their different
situations, so they have different interpretations on this notion. For China, because it
could no longer retain its self-sufficient energy circumstance, energy security
emphasized the ability to freely and promptly adjust itself to its reliance on global
energy market 84. Hughes further modified 4 ‗R‘ principles as dimensions to examine
energy security for states. They are: Review, reduce, replace and restrict 85. ‗Replace‘
refers to reliance on secure energy supplies instead of another insecure one by
diversifying, changing infrastructure and encouraging development of alternative energy
sources. In China, conventional fossil fuels which were highly relied upon have led to
damages for the society and economy. China is the largest consumer of coal in the
world86, but consuming coal is one of the ‗dirtiest‘ methods for generating power. Thus,
the central authorities would like to reduce the reliance on burning coals so as to
suppress the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. Apart from burning coal,
conventional hydrocarbon is another resource to be consumed for electricity and power.
The Chinese leadership and even the global economy worried the supply security of
fossil fuels and the instability of the Middle East in recent times 87 . Generating
hydroelectricity would mitigate the over-dependence on fossil fuels for China. As a
consequence, prompting development of hydroelectricity by dam construction is viewed
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as a strategic remedy of alleviating the threat of energy security in China. It also
explains why the central leadership since Mao‘s administration has hoped to reinforce
the share of hydroelectricity in electricity generation instead of burning coals 88. With the
considerable initial investment of dam construction, Chinese leaders have retained their
strong determination for developing hydroelectricity. For instance, former Premier Li
Peng expressed his great ambition of boosting the share of hydropower to the total
energy production for no less than 30% by 2010 89 . A Chinese hydrologist from the
Chinese Academy of Engineering even described hydropower is ‗the only viable way‘ of
curtailing the coal consumption of China 90.
Chart 2.4 – The Largest Hydroelectricity Consumers in the World, 2008

Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy -- June 2009, [Internet] (Accessed on 4 December
2009);
available
on
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statisti
cal_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_f
ull_report_2009.pdf

As such, dam construction projects have never been criticized in the
contemporary China. On the contrary, the advanced technology of construction has
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broadened the purposes of dams and further justified its necessity and feasibility of their
construction. Subsequently, Chinese authorities are so enthusiastic about constructing
numerous dams throughout the domain that British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has
portrayed the enthusiasm of the authorities to develop hydroelectricity in words like
‗[t]he five great rivers of Asia all rise in China… China wants to dam them all‘ 91 .
Hydroelectricity acts a more important role for supporting furious industrialization and
urbanization. Thus, it is not strange that China could become the largest single
hydroelectricity consumer. Chart 2.4 shows that the amount of hydroelectricity
consumed by China was tantamount to the half of what the OECD members consumed
in 2008.
By way of a short conclusion, dam construction in China has strong significance
beyond effective water management. It was a symbolic icon of humankind to defeat
nature and overcome devastating natural disasters, in particular, occasional flooding of
rivers. Moreover, modern technological improvement has contributed to the
diversification of functions for dam construction. Hydroelectricity generation is the most
tempting factor for state to commit in grand dam projects. This statement is particularly
true in energy-hungry China. As a consequence, hydropower development is the aspect
that this research would like to concentrate on. In the coming section, the Three Gorges
Project (TGP) approved in the 1990s and the Nu River Project (NRP) suspended in 2003
would be discussed so as to explain the reasons of choosing these two specific projects
as case studies. Besides, their background of construction and controversies would also
be briefly introduced respectively.
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Project Concentration
Prior to discussing the background of the projects individually, the objectives of
these two projects would be introduced. Previously mentioned, the modern dam
construction was multi-functional. Similarly, the functions of TGP and NRP are also
diverse. In the Table 2.5, their estimated direct benefits to the economy are listed.
Table 2.5 -- Functions and Estimated Direct Benefits of Projects
Items/Project
Hydroelectricity
Generation (Installed
Capacity)
Total Storage Capacity
Flood Control Storage
Navigation

Three Gorges Project(1)
17,680 MW
39.3 billion m3
22.1 billion m3
Reservoir level increases
10-100m to allow 10,000
tons to travel to the
upstream

Nu River Project(2)
23,320 MW
15.1 billion m3
N/A
N/A

Sources: (1) Extract from Table 3, Samuel Robert Fishleigh Allin, ‗An Examination of China‘s Three
Gorges Dam Project Based on Framework‘, [e-Paper Presented in the Report of the World Commission on
Dams]
(2004):16,
available
from:
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12142004125131/unrestricted/SAllin_010304.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2010); (2) Extract from Table 7, John Dore
& Yu Xiaogang, Update on China‘s Energy Industry Reforms and the Nu, Lancang & Jinsha Hydropower
Dams,
[Online
Working
Paper]
(Mar.
2004):
14-15,
available
from:
http://www.chinariversproject.org/files/Dore%20Yu%20Yunnan%20Hydropower%20Expansion.pdf
(accessed on 15 May 2010) .

In the previous section, the shortfall in, and appetite of, energy in China have been
demonstrated. However, the conventional thermal energy supplies brought various
drawbacks for Chinese environment, economy and strategic security. In order to
diversify energy supplies, giant dam construction projects were deemed necessary to
facilitate the hydroelectricity supply. Moreover, the central government prompted
economic development in the Western regions so as to mitigate the income disparity
between the prosperous coastal and inferior provinces. In Graph 2.6, the GDP growth
rates of Chongqing Municipality and Yunnan province, where the Three Gorges Dam
and the Nu River Dams are located in, as well as Chinese national data, are shown.
Referring to the graph, economic growth in Chongqing and Yunnan was varying and the
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trends were close to the national trend. However, Chongqing has had a greater economic
growth than the national average since 1992. It might probably be due to the enormous
capital injection for the TGP and its resettlement campaign.
Graph 2.6 – GDP Growth Rate of China, Chongqing Municipal City and Yunnan
Province

Source: CEIC Database

On the contrary, without the Nu river dams, Yunnan‘s economic growth rate has been
lower than the national level. Therefore, one may conclude that gigantic dam
construction projects, including TGP and NRP, were instruments to boast the domestic
economic growth of provinces.
On the other hand, both TGP and NRP were selected amongst a variety of dam
construction projects in China mainly because of their massive economic contribution to
the country, as well as to the local government. Besides, these two projects were chosen
because of the wide scope of the authorities and society in committing to both projects.
Another reason for picking these projects is their international controversies. The
Lancang-Mekong River Project was a project which has drawn intensive attention from
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international society and mass media, as it has led to diplomatic negotiations amongst
littoral countries. Thus, the consequences of Mekong Project might probably be
influenced by the diplomatic pressure from Chinese neighbours. In contrast, Nu River is
another transboundary river which originates from the Yunnan province, but foreign
diplomatic leverage in the NRP seems to be insignificant because the Burmese
government did not exhibit any fierce responses alike what Vietnamese and Thai
governments did against the Mekong Project. Since this research would like to
investigate the effective transformation of domestic factors in influencing the decision
making of hydropower development in China since economic reform, the Mekong
Project, albeit its greater fame, would be eliminated from the cases chosen to be studied
in this thesis.
Development of Three Gorges Project
Yangtze River (or also known as Changjiang) is the longest river and the largest
river system in China. It penetrates the whole domain of China from Tibet and Qinghai
in the west to the East Sea. Millions of people‘s livelihoods traditionally relied on the
river, especially for the residents in rural regions. Due to the vital importance of the
Yangtze, the Three Gorges Project experienced more than a half-century of debates and
political indecision which is uncommon for dam construction projects on the globe.
Even with the construction near completion, the debates about the project have not
subsided yet. In retrospect, the idea of TGP was first suggested by Sun Yat-sen in the
1920s. In his vision of developing China, Sun believed the necessity of hydroelectricity
to drive the modernization of China and highlighted the huge potential for generating
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hydro-electricity at Yichang, Hubei 92 . Graph 2.7 illustrated the area of reservoir and
inundation after the completion of TGP, which is located in Yichang.
Graph 2.7 – Map of Three Gorges Dam and Reservoir Area

Source: Figure 1, Hu Yong, ‗Mapping methane emissions from the three gorges reservoir area: A
feasibility study‘ GIS Development, [Internet] (accessed on 6 January 2010) available from:
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/application/environment/water/ma04240a.htm

Sun‘s positive argument of hydroelectricity is similar to Vladimir Lenin‘s. Lenin
proclaimed that electricification is one of the necessary reasons for communism – the
ideal stage of social development in Marxian philosophy – and the Soviet power is
another one 93 . Sun‘s dream hydraulic power was inherited by his successors and
following famous leaders, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mao
even visited Yangtze and affirmed the necessity of TGP in journeys. He wrote a poem to
reveal his desire to utilize the project to on the one hand to enrich the country; and on
the other hand, resolve occasionally the deadly flooding of the river94,
Snails move with the wind.
Tortoise and snake still
Great Plans are afoot:
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…
Walls of stone will stand upstream to the west
To hold back Wushan‘s clouds and rain
Till smooth lake rises in the narrow gorges.
The mountain goddess if she is still there
Will marvel at a world so changed95.
Mao‘s poem reflected the view that the TGP is more than a mere infrastructure project;
it could also symbolize the prosperity and power of China. As a result, the project has
enjoyed a great flock of prestige and praises from the authorities and leaderships even
after the death of Mao.
In spite of the great zealousness of leaders, the unprecedented enormous costs
and commitments necessary for undertaking the project had never been overlooked.
Subsequently, there had been great debate on feasibility of the project for more than 50
years, and it did not achieve any consensus. In the 1980s, although Deng Xiaoping – the
paramount leader – decided to establish the construction of TGP, there were still fierce
debates within the bureaucratic system, and even the central leadership, on various
issues pertaining to the project. The Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electricity was
ordered to gather professional planning and surveys for the proposed TGP96. Hence, the
project had not been substantially established and remained the stage of planning. This
cleavage will be discussed in the coming chapter. Until 1989, the State Council proposed
the feasibility survey report to the National People Congress (NPC) for approval. This
was the initiation of the central government to promote the Three Gorges Project
systematically and formally. It was not approved by the NPC at that time, which decided
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to shelve it for seven years so as to have time to conduct in-depth investigation on the
feasibility and planning of the project 97.
The debates did not only exist within the massive bureaucracy, it also expanded
to the civil society. A number of intellectuals and individual activists in China, led by
Dai Qing, allied with foreign mass media organs to publish or publicize criticisms
against TGP98. They struck the feasibility of the project in various perspectives and their
arguments stirred up controversy about the TGP in abroad. Shockingly, the shelved
proposal was re-submitted again to the fifth meeting of 7th NPC in 1992. Unfortunately,
these three foregoing years did not bring any consensus for the project within the
bureaucracy. The NPC voting results revealed that cleavages were not completely erased.
In Table 2.8, the voting results of the TGP in the NPC are listed. Over 30% of delegates
voted against or abstain from the project. Subsequently, the existence of resistance in the
NPC should not be underestimated or neglected.
Table 2.8 – Voting Results of the Proposal of the TGP in NPC on 3 April 1992
Items of Vote
Numbers of Vote
Percentage of
Vote99

Agree
1767
67.75%

Disagree
177
6.79%

Abstain
664
25.46%

Total
2608
100%

Source: Heggelund, 2004: 32

Some sensitive scholars pointed out the correlation between political atmosphere at that
period and the voting results and disclosed the political significance of the TGP. It was
claimed that the hasty and divided decision of the NPC towards the project was
manipulated by the Zhongnanhai so as to consolidate the legitimacy of communist party

97

Heggelund, 2004: 31-32.
Dai Qing edited a couple of critical books to include these literatures against the proposal and
feasibility report which the CCP proposed, but the books were prohibited to be published in China.
Alana Boland, however, denounced Dai and her fellow’s arguments to be undemocratic and to enhance
the technocratic and developmentalist thought of the state. See: Alana Boland, ‘The Three Gorges
Debate and Scientific Decision-Making in China’, China Information 13, No.1 (Summer 1998), 25-29.
99
Calculated by author
98

41

state, as the June-Fourth Massacre seriously damaged the legitimacy of Chinese
communist party as the ruling party. The cruel and autocratic oppression stirred up
questions about the deterioration and continuity of the party leadership 100. Meanwhile,
the TGP was a prestige project of the nation for Chinese political and intellectual elite101.
Therefore, any opposition against the project was thoroughly suppressed so as to
smoothen the implementation as soon as possible.
According to the official plan, the TGP is currently near completion and it should
have already generated electricity for several years. However, criticisms and problems
are gradually uncovered, in particular in the aspect of resettlement. Debate on the
projects seems to be more rigorous. This phenomenon is the consequence of the
inadequate transparency and narrow scope of participation 102. It typically reflects that
the characteristics of first stage of hydropower development in China – the major driver
of project is the central authorities, and other bureaucracies as well as the civil society
are just the agents for implementing policies and actualizing the visions and directions
proposed by the centre.
Development of Nu/Salween River Project
The Nu River (also known as ‗Salween River‘ in Southeast Asia) is one of the
largest river systems in Asia and critical trans-boundary water network of China and her
South-East Asian neighbours. Locating in the most remote region of China, the Nu River
remains undeveloped for dams. Its unique ecological and environmental resources have
never been exploited. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) announced the solitary landscape of ‗Three Parallel River‘

100

Huggelund, 2004:32; Tashi Tsering, China’s Water Politics: In Whose Interest?, (M.A. Diss., Portland
State University, 2005) [Online thesis] available from:
http://www.greengrants.org.cn/file/pub/inwhoseinterest.pdf (accessed on 10 Nov. 2009): 32-33.
101
Baurch, 1998: 99-100.
102
Dai & Sullivan, 1999, 71

42

(Sanjiang Biliu) near Nu River as a Cultural Heritage preserve in 2003, but the Yunnan
provincial government proposed to construct 13 dams along the river one year after.
This plan stirred up heat controversy within China and abroad. With reference to the
Graph 2.9, the provincial office planned to construct 13 dams and two reservoir areas
(liang ku shishan ji) at the upper reaches of the Nu River. It is expected that an installed
capacity of over 23,000MW (megawatt) hydroelectricity will be generated after the
completion of this project103. More than 50,000 people were estimated to be relocated
due for relocation because of the project.
In contrast, the NRP is smaller scale than TGP in terms of resettlement and
commitment of bureaucratic system, but it does not mean that it has a smoother
implementation. On the contrary, the NRP has encountered a more rigorous debate
during the planning process. In 2002-2003, the Chinese national power company was
separated into 5 state-owned electricity corporations, and they are: China Huaneng
Group, China Huadian Group, China Guodian Corporation, China Power Investment
Corporation and China Datang Corporation. Competition amongst electricity groups
motivated them to actively cooperate with provincial governments to develop
hydroelectricity so as to maximize their returns from electricity generation 104 . This
phenomenon was known as ‗enclosing rivers by marking preemptive investment‘
(Paoma Juanshui). The Huadian Group had achieved agreement with Yunnan‘s
provincial government to establish a company to develop hydroelectricity from the Nu
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River and invest capital to implement the proposal of NRP in 2003 105 . Prior to the
agreement between Yunnan government and Huadian, the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) approved the NRP proposal and the State Council then
approved the NRP in March 2003 106. Surprisingly, the Chinese ENGOs became major
opponents and obstacles of the project. They criticized the project via various channels
and strategies so as to reinforce the pressure on the central government to suspend the
project. This transformation would be discussed in the chapter 5. In addition, the project
was ordered to be shelved temporarily by Premier Wen Jiabao in order for it to be
‗carefully discussed and decided on scientifically‘ in 2004107. This is a rare practice in
Chinese politics. Therefore, the NRP has drawn the attention of scholars and
commentators to investigate and analyze the emergence of civil society and grassroots‘
activisms in China.
Graph 2.9 – Map of Nu River Project
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Source: International Rivers [Internet] (accessed
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/image/trd/109

on

6

January

2010);

available

from

Even if there was anxiety about the re-submission of the proposal of NRP after Wen‘s
order, the provincial authorities have been facing a heavy pressure from the public,
mobilized by ENGOs, individual activists and even media to stop the project. The
project has thereby not been implemented hitherto.
The NRP‘s failure was seen to reflect the increased pluralism in China. In effect,
the project was not hindered not only by the state-society-level conflicts, but also
obstructed by the diverse positions taken amongst bureaucracies and the interest
conflicts underneath. Thus, the bargaining process of NRP effectively reflects pluralism
in the contemporary China which is likely the consequence of economic liberalization.
In sum, dam construction should not be simply recognized as a policy of
encouraging economic development since the notion of modernization is closely
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intertwined with development of hydroelectricity in China. Moreover, because China
has over-relied on coals for energy generation, it would constitute a heavy burden of
responsibility – both empirically and ethically – for China to curtail the greenhouse gas
emission. Therefore, the development of hydroelectricity should be, and has been,
encouraged due to its relatively ‗greener‘ stereotype in the viewpoint of Chinese
authorities. The TGP and the NRP are typical exemplifiers reflecting the evolution of
perceptions in favour of hydroelectricity. Additionally, they also indicated the
transformation of the Chinese bureaucratic systems and the emergence of civil society,
as shown by discussing their decision-making processes respectively.
In this chapter, the most significant events surrounding the decision-making
processes of these two projects have been sketched respectively. Further in-depth
interpretation would be mentioned in the following chapters and the attitudes of several
actors towards each other would be analyzed. As a result, the determiningc factors that
influenced the success or failure of the TGP and NRP could be induced. The first actor
discussed in the next chapter is the central government.
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Chapter 3 – Limitation of Project Governance: Fragmentation and
Cleavages of the Central Authorities
In an authoritarian regime, the central government acts as the most critical part of
the decision making process, at least in theory. Moreover, the central government is
perceived as the last referee of bureaucratic bargaining and coordination in the hierarchy.
In the China‘s case, the central government is also a vital important actor to the
decision-making process of mega projects, like the Three Gorges Project and Nu River
Project. However, through investigating the decision making process and having the
rationales analyzed in various perspectives, in addition to explaining the interaction
between bureaucracies and organizations from the perspective of the centre, this chapter
aims to examine how decision making towards the two projects by two generations of
party leadership has changed, so as to reflect the limitation of the central leadership in
policy formulation. In this chapter, the projects would be analyzed from the viewpoints
of the centre. The interactions with provincial governments and ENGOs that the central
authorities expected to have would also be included in this chapter. How the central
government operated would be generalized and the political significance and interests of
these two projects to the centre would be examined. Not only would central-provincial
relationship and state-society relationship be understood, the structure of the central
leadership would also be discerned.
This chapter would argue that the fragmentation of interests inside the
bureaucracies hampered the efficiencies of decision making. Moreover, this
fragmentation was the largest obstacle obstructing the success of policy implementation.
Subsequently, the transformation of polity in China enabled the interests of political
organs to become more distinct, and it even brings about the dichotomy and coalition
amongst organs in the centre. The difficulty of successful dam construction is greater.
The first section of this chapter would give an analysis of the perspective of the centre
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towards the TGP, and detail how the centre expected to work with the localities and
society. Then, the relatively indifferent participation of the centre in the NRP would be
discussed. Apart from considering the actions that centre chose to implement, this
chapter would also study tactics of the centre behind these projects so as to indicate the
priorities in the mind of central leadership. Prior to all these analysis, the notion of
central leadership should be clarified.
In traditional communist political systems, the mighty communist party was
granted the power of overruling, overseeing and managing public institutions, like the
government, enterprises, civil society, etc. Thus, the Standing Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP (Hereafter as ―PSC‖), which is the highest bureaucratic body of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), contains the most powerful elites of the Chinese
government. This small group of officials is currently composed of 9 core leaders of the
party state and is presided over by Hu Jintao 108. The ‗central leadership‘ generally refers
to this small group of elites in this thesis. On the other hand, there are a number of
bureaucratic organs in the party and in the government under this layer of officials, such
as ministries from the State Council, commissions and committees from the party and
also the military. Vertically, all these bureaucratic organs in the central government
seem to be subordinated to the central leadership, which suggests, promotes and
executes its policy directions and planning through commands and orders. The National
People‘s Congress (NPC) which is the highest legislative body in China is subsequently
viewed as the ‗rubber stamp‘ of the central leadership and only ‗solidifies the central
political tasks for the party‘ 109 . Being the apex of authority in the Chinese political
system, the central leadership enjoys the highest privilege and political status in the
108
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system. However, it has been argued that the authority of the central leadership has been
subjected to more challenges than at the beginning of the establishment of the state. The
transformation of the political context, as encountered by the central leadership in these
two projects, would be analyzed in the forthcoming sections to highlight the limitations
of decision making by the leadership.

The Centre in the TGP – Oppressive and Strong
If we were to go through the history of the TGP, we will discover how China‘s
central authorities supported and praised the project; even though the political
environment had remained unstable for century. No different from their predecessors,
leaders of the PRC also praised the putative contribution of TGP. Notwithstanding
strong controversies against the project domestically and abroad, as well as the
anticipation of massive technical difficulties in advance, the central leadership insisted
on constructing the enormous Three Gorges Dam. The major activities of the central
government in the project could be summarized into three aspects -- ideological,
financing and resettlement.
First, millions of people needed to be displaced because of inundation and the
investment cost of the central government was estimated at approximately 90 billion
yuan 110 . According to a local cadre from Chongqing municipality, the number of
resettlers approximately reached 1.12-1.13 million. Over 20 cities or counties, 356
communes, 116 townships and 1,711 villages were affected because of the project in
2005111. Additionally, the whole hierarchy of the government needed to commit to the
projects in different ways (see Table 3.1). Thus, leaders needed to promote the project
and legitimatize such unprecedented commitments of these units.
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Table 3.1 – Commitments of Various Stakeholders in TGP
Aspect

Stakeholders

Responsibility (ies)

Government

Ministries
&  To supervise the completion
Departments at the of project on time
Central Level 112
 To take up the responsibility
of technical research and
provide
resources
and
information
for
relevant
departments in the provincial
level

Ministries
&  Providing temptations to
Departments at the attract capital in the reservoir
Provincial Level114
areas according to variety of
circumstances in counties115
 To set up resettlement bureau
at various levels of the
hierarchal so as to complete the
resettlement campaign

Private-Public Enterprises

State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs)

Township-Village

 To invest in the pillar
industries of the reservoir areas
so as to develop the economy
 State-owned banks needed to
manage the project funds for
construction and economic
development, as well as to
provide direct loans for relevant
SOEs or TVEs
 Local SOEs needed to
relocate to new reservoir areas
and employ landless farmers
after relocation
 To resettle in the newly-

112

Commitment(s)
 To delegate authority to the
branches at lower level
 To be directly instructed and
coordinated
by
the
TGP
Construction Committee under
the State Council
 To allocate 100 billion yuan of
capital and resources to the
construction site and reservoir
areas for construction from
1992113
 To issue more than 8.7 billion
yuan national bond for supporting
economic and environment in
reservoir areas from 2001
 To further implement policies
from the central government in
accordance with local situations,
especially in the aspect of
resettlement
 To become the front-line
delegates of the party state in order
to overcome various problems in
midst of the project
 To
provide
sufficient
compensation for relocating people
and enterprises according to their
different local situations and
necessity of related people and
enterprises116
 China Development Bank
 Half of local inefficient SOEs
were terminated before relocation


 Every TVEs received 7,000 yuan

Heggelund, 2004: 33-37.
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Enterprises (TVEs)/ established or resettled counties
Private Enterprises  To absorb landless farmers
in Reservoir Areas after relocation because of
and nearby117
industrial transformation

subsidy from the government for
every employed resettler118
 1.5million workers in Chongqing
were employed in private
sector119

Generally, the central leadership embellished the necessity for, and significance of, the
project ideologically with: Leninist and Nationalist doctrines. Li Peng, the former Prime
Minister of State Council who proposed to construct the TGP and became the most
important supporter of the project, stressed the aggregated contributions of the dam to
anti-flooding, electricity generation, navigation and water supply, in his annual report at
the 5th Meeting of the 7th National People‘s Congress120. Ordinary Chinese people were
generally brainwashed by the notion that ‗humans must conquer nature‘ from Leninist
doctrines during Mao‘s administration. The TGP came to be valued as the symbol of
humanity‘s success in overcoming natural constraints. Particularly, because the middle
reaches of Yangtze were frequently struck by devastating flooding, the project was
praised as a triumphant instrument of humankinds to defeat natural disasters 121 . The
leadership, besides, praised the success of the construction of the TGP ideologically as
reflecting of ‗Chairman Mao‘s desire‘ (Mao zhuxi de xinyuan) and ‗Deng Xiaoping‘s
support and concern‘ (Deng Xiaoping de zhichi he guanxin)122. The TGP was justified in
term of the social and economic development of China. Nevertheless, Dai criticized the
project as reflecting ‗uncontrolled‘ (Bujia jiezhi) development in China. It represented
the conscious reluctance of the Chinese government to restrain itself from pursuing
117
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development123. In sum, the central authorities lobbied and promoted the project with its
socialist and developmentalist ideologies. This action was criticized by foreign activists
and the mass media as irrational and inefficient 124 .
Alternatively, the central authorities were also required to address questions
pertaining to the financing of the project after approval was given. Particularly the
World Bank (WB) which is one of the largest lenders for dam construction projects in
the world was not involved in financing the project. As a result, the Chinese authorities
needed to finance the project solely. To overcome the considerable cost of construction,
they proposed three sources of financing beyond direct capital injection from the centre,
and they are: 1) fixed percentage sharing of revenue from electricity sold to the
construction fund; 2) domestic loans from the China Development Bank; 125 and, 3)
allocating a proportion of revenue from the Gezhouba Hydro-Dam which is just nearby
with the account of the fund managed by the China Construction Bank (CBC)126. The
capital injected for dam construction was collectively managed by the China Three
Gorges Corporation (CTGC).To seek for sufficient sources for the project is an
important and exclusive responsibility of the central government. Unfortunately, the
diverse methods of collecting capital were not unable to fulfill the appetite of the project;
it is largely because the returns of electricity sales would be ex-post and only contribute
123
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to the project in 2003. Thus the central government remained the largest investor for the
project before 2003127.
Traditionally, involuntary resettlement tends to be coordinated and mobilized by
the state. Thus, another responsibility of the central government is to address the
enormous resettlement issues associated with the project. The TGP construction resulted
in an unprecedented number of resettlers displaced from their lands. It was a vast
challenge for the Chinese authorities on how to persuade, arrange and manage the
resettlement of more than a million of affected people. Hence, the authorities proposed
the concept of ‗development-oriented resettlement‘ and guaranteed that,
‗…the residents-resettlement funds shall be used in an
overall way, the resources rationally exploited, the
ecological environment protected and the residents to
be resettled properly relocated to ensure that their
working and living conditions reach or surpass their
previous level and that favourable conditions are
created for the economic and social development in
the Three Gorges reservoir area. 128‘
In other words, the regulation provides legal guarantee for those relocated that
their livelihoods would improve after the relocation and requests relevant administration
units to prevent impoverishment. Through this regulation, the ordinary people would
hopefully view relocation as an opportunity for improving their livelihoods. In addition
to the embellishment on the economic significance of the project for the state and
ideological mobilization from the party, people generally perceived themselves to be

127

Jackson & Sleigh, 2000: 231.
Article 3,PRC National People’s Congress, Regulations on Residents-Resettlement for the Yangtze River
Three Gorges Project Construction, (15 Feb, 2001), effective since 1 Mar, 2001, [Internet] available from
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/24/content_25797.htm; (accessed on 17 Sep 2008).
128

53

relocated involuntarily but still able to achieve collective improvement 129. Consequently,
people were more likely to be mobilized for relocation 130.
After the debatable approval of the Three Gorges Project from the NPC,
repressions against domestic opposition seemed to be more frequent and rigorous. In
order to further legitimatize the project, the government banned any opposition voices in
the society and mass media. For example, a publicity campaign which aimed to guide
public opinion and mass media to publish favourable reports, editorials and
commentaries was launched before the approval of TGP from NPC in 1992131. These
actions reflected that mere ideological persuasions and economic meanings could no
longer suffice to explain the strong attitude of the central leadership. Therefore, the
political meanings of the project in the central perspective should be included in the
analysis.
Political Background of the Centre in the late-1980s in the Construction of the TGP
The greatest political incident and challenge to the CCP in the late-1980s should
be the June-Fourth Massacre after which the CCP was presented with a severe
legitimacy challenge on both domestic and international levels because of the cruel
oppression. It was hence necessary for the party leadership to seek means for
consolidating its legitimacy. As mentioned in chapter 2, the TGP is a symbol of national
pride of China. The lengthy history of foreign invasion since the late Qing dynasty
contributed to the Chinese having a fervid fantasy for sovereign strength and prosperity.
For example, the Self-Strengthening Movement in the late Qing Dynasty enforced a
variety of military modernization to defend against invasions by Western imperialist
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powers, and the Great Leap Forward Movement mobilized the population into a series of
industrialization, collectivization and economic modernization so as to boost the China‘s
economy into surpassing developed economies. Mega development projects, such as the
TGP, were claimed as opportunities to provide a brighter future for the state to escape
from the history of being weak and invaded 132 . The successful construction of these
projects might indicate that the party state could bring about a powerful and prosperous
prospect to the country. It is reasonable to conclude that the CCP would like to
consolidate its legitimacy and show its great contribution in constructing a modernized
and powerful China with the TGP133.
The major features of the political context for the TGP in the 1980s were not
confined to the legitimacy crisis of the party state. The technocratic nature of the party
leadership was also another political circumstance to be considered. In Table 3.2, the
academic backgrounds of the central leadership since 1989 are listed. It shows that the
overwhelming majority of members from the PSC were well-educated and they have
largely majored in engineering or technocratic disciplines.
Table 3.2 – Academic Background of Leaders
13th Standing Committee of
the Politburo of the CCP
(1989-1992)

15th Standing Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP (19972002)

17th Standing Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP (2007Present)

Name

Education
Background

Name

Education
Background

Name

Education
Background

Jiang
Zemin

University
Graduate,
majoring
electrical
engineering,
Shanghai Jiao
Tong

Jiang
Zemin

University
Graduate, majoring
electrical
engineering,
Shanghai Jiao Tong
University,

Hu Jintao

University
Graduate,
Graduated from
the specialty of
hub hydropower
stations of the
Department of
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University,
Engineer

Engineer

Water
Conservancy
Engineering of
Tsinghua
University,
Engineer

Yao
Yilin

N/A

Li Peng

University
Graduate, majoring
in hydroelectric
engineering,
Moscow Power
Engineering
Institute, Senior
Engineer

Wu
Bangguo

University
Graduate, the
Department of
Radio and
Electronics of
Tsinghua
University,
majoring in
electronic vacuum
devices., Engineer

Song
Ping

University
Graduate,
Agricultural
Faculty,
Peking
University,
Revolutionary
Leader

Zhu
Rongji

University
Graduate, majoring
electrical
engineering.
Tsinghua
University,
Engineer

Wen Jiabao

University
Graduate, Beijing
Institute of
Geology,
majoring in
geological
structure,
Engineer

Qiao Shi

University
Graduate,
Shanghai
Tongji
University,
Revolutionary
Leader

Li
Ruihuan

Certificate
Graduate, majoring
industrial and
civilian
architecture, sparetime architecture
engineering
institute, Carpenter

Jia Qinglin

University
Graduate, the
Department of
Electric Power of
Hebei
Engineering
College, majoring
in electric motor
and appliance
design and
manufacturing,
Senior engineer

Li Peng

University
Graduate,
majoring in
hydroelectric
engineering,
Moscow Power
Engineering
Institute, Senior
Engineer

Hu
Jingtao

University
Graduate,
Department of
Water Conservancy
Engineering of
Tsinghua
University,Engineer

Li
Changchun

University
Graduate,
Department of
Electric
Machinery of
Harbin Institute of
Technology,
majoring in
industrial
enterprise
automation,
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Engineer
Li
Ruihuan

Certificate
Graduate,
majoring
industrial and
civilian
architecture,
Spare-time
Architecture
Engineering
Institute,
Carpenter

Wei
Jianxing

University
Graduate, majoring
in mechanical
engineering,
Dailian University
of Technology,
Senior Engineer

Xi Jinping

University
Graduate,
Department of
Water
Conservancy
Engineering of
Tsinghua
University,
Engineer

Li
Lanqing

University
Graduate,
Department of
Enterprise
Management,
Fudan University

Li Keqiang

University
Graduate, the
School of
Economics of
Peking
University,
majoring in
economics,
Doctor of
Economic

He
Guoqiang

University
Graduate,
Inorganic
Chemical
Engineering
Department,
Beijing Institute
of Chemical
Engineering,
majoring in
inorganic
engineering,
Senior Engineer

Zhou
Yongkang

University
Graduate, the
Exploration
Department,
Beijing Petroleum
Institute, majoring
in geophysical
exploration,Senior
Engineer
equivalent to
Professor
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;
Wikipedia;
available
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from
from

The similar background of high-leveled officials implied intentions to rely on
technologies for development. They were commonly known as ‗Red Specialists‘
(Hongshe Zhuanjia). Dai explained the resulting drawback of the overwhelming
domination of technocrats in the leadership is the reckless decision to develop high
technology by the state. In other words, high technological construction would become
the most dominant method of economic and social development. In the meanwhile, it is
less likely for them to consider the environment, ecology and humanitarian costs of
developing high technological projects. Given that the technocratic party leadership
encountered an arduous political environment associated with the June-Forth Massacre,
they might further be motivated to launch the TGP.
Implicitly, the TGP was a tool for safeguarding the interest of leaders and their
families, especially Li Peng, who was the former Prime Minister in the early 1990s. Li
was the largest supporter and driving force of the TGP in pushing for its approval in the
decision making and planning. He repeatedly expressed his favourable stance for the
project publicly. For instance, he ideologically justified the project by equating it to
socialism‘s triumphs and praising it as a reflection of ‗the fighting spirit of the Chinese
people and the superiority of the socialist system‘134. However, once the involvement of
his family in the power sector is included in the consideration, Li‘s motivation for
driving the success of TGP might be questioned. His son is the president and his wife is
a major shareholder of one of the largest state-owned power generating company –
Huaneng Power. His daughter Li Xiaolin is also the vice manager of the China Power
Investment Corporation. Huaneng Power is one of main shareholders of the China
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Yangtze Power Corporation Limited (CYPC) which is the operator of hydroelectricity
generation at the Three Gorges Dam 135 . Therefore Li‘s family was believed to have
privately benefited from the TGP and the project was contemptuously referred to as ‗Li
Peng‘s pet project‘ 136 . In some extents, this could also explain Li‘s enthusiasm for
promoting the project and the autocratic decision making.
Considering the unique political atmosphere in China after the Tiananmen
Massacre, the composition of the leadership and even the implicit benefits to the leaders
and their families, the intoxication of the party leadership for the TGP could be
uncovered and explained. TGP, in the eyes of the leaders, is not only a necessary means
of economic development for the state, but also a tool of expanding their political power
and ensuring their private interests 137 . It could reasonably explain the oppressive
presence and attitude of the autocratic central government in the decision-making
process of the TGP. In China, criticisms against the project have been close to ‗taboo‘
and they would be strictly repressed by the authorities. This implies an up-to-down
decision-making approach of the TGP in which the central leadership becomes the sole
decision maker of the implementation of the project, while the SOEs, ministries,
provincial governments and other bureaucratic organs were just instruments of the
implementation. Nevertheless, the decision making process seems to be more
complicated than the leadership-oriented approach. In addition, despite the tendency of
approving the project in an up-to-down approach, this did not mean that consensus was
easy to achieve in the central and even leadership level.
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In retrospect, the controversies of the TGP had achieved another high point in the
early 1980s. The famous Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, aggressively promoted a series
of economic and social reforms so as to encourage modernization of the country. Similar
to Mao, Deng believed that a great leap forward in the modernization of hydroelectricity
would consolidate social modernization in economic reforms. Therefore, he was
seemingly quite determined to launch the TGP so as to deal with the necessity of
hydroelectricity generation, flood control and navigation in the late 1970s; although the
central leadership did not completely achieve the consensus of launching the project in
spite of Deng‘s determination. According to Li, Chen Yun and Zhao Ziyang showed
reservations to the project. Zhao, who would shortly be the Sichuan provincial leader
and then the Prime Minister of China, showed his anxiety for the considerable amount of
land which would be inundated and people to be resettled due to the project. Chen, the
‗economic Tsar‘ and another important eminent leader of the CCP, questioned the
financial and administrative abilities of the party to launching the gigantic TGP
aggressively before 1990s138. However, Chen and Zhao were cautious in proposing their
opposition. Chen approached Li Rui who was a major opponent in China and allied with
him to write a series of documents criticizing the proposal of TGP from the Ministry of
Water Conservancy, to request the leadership to be more deliberative on for the
project139. The significant reservation of Chen and Zhao made the decision of launching
TGP in the early 1980s unrealistic. Moreover, cleavages of opinions amongst other
leaders also became more apparent.
Owing to the lack of consensus among the leadership, ministries, departments
and state-owned enterprises, opinion at the central level remained fragmented towards
138
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the project. The common ground among relevant ministries and departments was their
perception of Deng‘s advocacy of the project, so they tended not to directly challenge
Deng‘s instruction. Nevertheless, in order to obstruct any reckless and rapid
implementation, opposing agencies suggested having a slower pace of implementation
via a variety of methods. For instance, the separation of the Ministry of Water
Conservancy and Electric Power into the Ministry of Water Conservancy and the
Ministry of Electric Power in 1979 reflected inter-ministry controversy towards the
project. The Ministry of Water Conservancy was one of the major supporters for the
project and enthusiastically promoted the approval of the TGP proposal as soon as
possible. Unfortunately, they disputed with the Ministry of Electric Power because of
repeated arguments on the priorities and details of the project, such as investments,
administrative supervision and processes140. The reorganization of the Ministry of Water
Conservancy and Electric Power led to the surfacing of this ‗in-house‘ argument within
the ministry and even in the State Council. Additionally, although it would like to
prevent direct contests against paramount leader, central authorities might dispute the
technological problems and details so as to slow the pace of getting approval for the
project.
In short, due to its inheritance of the traditional up-to-down approach in the
Leninist socialist bureaucratic system, the central leadership had provided the core
dynamic for the approval of the TGP. However, the cleavages of opinions amongst the
leadership reflected the difficulties of successful implementation of dam construction.
Further, the cleavages were not confined to within the leadership; it extended to
ministries and departments of the central government. Accordingly, the project was not
substantially approved throughout the 1980s until the Tiananmen Massacre. Since the
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Massacre, the political environment, particularly in the central level, experienced a great
change. For example, leadership became more autocratic and more technocratic officials
entered the leadership. Thus, dam construction was praised as the most triumphant
instrument of social and economic modernization. TGP was thereby approved, albeit
with the existence of a number of unsolved problems and questions.

The Centre in the NRP – Indifferent but Critical Referee
Central Direction & Manipulation of Political Economy
In contrast, the attitude of the central leadership in the NRP was not as eager as
in the TGP. The most obvious participation of the central leadership throughout the
decision-making process of NRP was through the instruction of suspending the
implementation of NRP and the leadership ‗cautiously studied, and scientifically
decided‘ it 141. The presence of the central leaders in the project, to a large extent, implies
intervening policies of local development in provinces, rather than simple suspension.
Yardley even described that this instruction ‗signals that China‘s top leaders have not a
plan that most dam opponents had considered a fait accompli‘142. In other words, Wen‘s
order reflected that the implicit political cleavages between the centre and locals, which
gives space to environmental protection activists to lobby their interests in order to shape
policy making process; something which is rare in the Chinese bureaucratic system.
Nevertheless, the suspension could not thereby be concluded that the central leadership
either would like to degrade the priority of developing hydroelectricity or that it has lost
its bargaining power with social organizations. Therefore, prior to analyzing the
141
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interactive mechanism from the central perspective, a number of pre-depositions should
be clarified and explained.
First, notwithstanding the rapid economic growth in the last decade of the 20 th
century, the Chinese government put significant efforts towards maintaining a highgrowth economy. Economic growth and development has never been out of the agenda
of central leadership. In the 11th Five-Year-Plan, the new leadership expressed its vision
of constructing a more diversified energy sector beyond consuming fossil fuels and
hydroelectricity through ‗administrative means‘ 143 . Apparently, ‗development‘ is still
dominating the high priority of leaders, but they are concerned and thus mentioned the
importance of environment more frequently than their predecessors. Subsequently, it is
more likely for the new leadership to be deliberating dam construction projects.
The leverage of market mechanism, then, has penetrated a vital position in the
Chinese bureaucratic system since the reform period. It is believed that the Chinese
political system has transited from traditional socialist hierarchy to a more liberal and
modernized system. The FA model argued and highlighted the transition of dynamics of
bureaucratic apparatus from vertical relationship (i.e. chief-subordinate relationship) to a
more ‗market-oriented‘ and ‗rule-guided‘ one 144 . Therefore, policies have become
considerably more utilitarian. The implementation of recent policies does not only rely
on central commands, but also on market contribution to the policies, although the
central authorities are still ‗holding back on giving freer rein to market mechanisms and
using tighter administrative controls to monitor the economy in general 145‘. For example,
a number of SOEs have been privatized in a certain extent since the 1990s, so profit
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seeking and efficiency have become major objectives for SOEs in expanding the
business scale. Market mechanism acted mere prominently in the polity and has
encouraged the bureaucratic apparatus to awaken their political and administrative
interests. As a result, the cleavage amongst central ministries becomes more apparent
and the NRP is a good example to illustrate this phenomenon.
Although the central authorities have emphasized the significance of developing
hydroelectricity as a grand strategy, central ministries were not unified for the dam; with
the NRP significantly reflecting this phenomenon. The National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) approved and supported the project with the initial
schedule of the dam taken from the proposal presented to State Council for final
approval and construction to commence in September, 2003. However, the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)146 criticized the project and published
an article against the construction of the NRP 147 . The large inconsistency among
ministries in the central authorities contributed to the postponement of the approval, and
thus activists had room to fight for re-consideration of the project after the enforcement
of the law. Further, ministries informally worked with organizations and localities in
accordance with their diverse interests. The subsequently agglomerate behaviors were
similar to two adverse coalitions which commonly aimed to influence the decision of the
central leadership. Graph 3.3 shows the structure and linkages of these two coalitions.
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Graph 3.3 – The Campaign and its Institutional Setting in the NRP

Source: Graph 2 in Michael Busgen, NGOs and the Search for Chinese Civil Society Environmental NonGovernmental Organizations in the Nujiang Campaign, (Feb, 2006), [E-working paper] available from
http://cendoc.esan.edu.pe/fulltext/e-documents/ISS-NL/wp422.pdf (accessed on 30 Nov., 2009), 28.

They were organized into two campaigns in accordance with their stance for/against the
NRP; therefore, their stances were portrayed as ‗adversaries‘ in this contest of interest,
with the supporting side led by the Huadian hydropower Corporation and the provincial
government. However, the anti-dam coalition was the major dynamic in the campaign.
For the supporting side, ministries and localities argued that the mega-project
could develop the infrastructure of the Nu River region, which is the most remote and
poverty-stuck region in China. Due to the geographical constraints, the Nu River region
has rarely attracted capital to invest. Additionally, indigenous people in this region are
mainly ethnic minority and poorly educated; hence, it is more difficult for them to be
alleviated from poverty. Hydro-electricity which is perceived as a type of ‗clean‘ power
supply, could effectively resolve these two constraints of development 148 . From the
graph, the processes of initiation of the project are shown; however, the graph does not
148
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show the efforts of the supporting coalition to lobby its interest. For instance, they
gathered local intellectuals who mainly stand for the project and had a meeting in
Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan province, allowing their views and arguments to be
publicized by local newspapers in the spring of 2003 149 . Also, the local government
further justified the project with the promotion of responding to the ‗Open up the West‘
Campaign. Moreover, due to the mightiness of the NDRC in the bureaucratic systems,
the supporting coalitions seemed to be in advantage of this campaign, as they were
seemingly giving the impression of having greater influence on the central leadership.
In effect, the central leadership, through its mighty authority in determining the
success or failure of the project, is the only referee of the project whose responsibilities
are providing the final approval and coordinating work with other relevant departments
or ministries, such as SEPA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc. Subsequently, the
central leadership seems to have no absolute stance on the NRP. However, some central
ministries or commissions, like NDRC and Huadian, etc, would stand favourably for the
project because of their policy interests. The NDRC which aims to balance the economic
and social development of the whole country has a similar vision to the provincial
government and believes that the project would benefit residents in the reservoir area
through a better material livelihood. Thus, it might also hope that electricity generated
from the NRP could be sent to the coastal regions for consumption 150. Unfortunately,
electricity companies such as Huadian are more likely to participate in developing
hydroelectricity simply because there is an enormous amount of cheap electricity to be
sold. Thus, it agreed to establish the Yunnan Huadian Nujiang River Hydropower
Development Co. Ltd (YHNHD) with the Yunnan Provincial government and its
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investment corporation in 2003. Referring to Table 3.5, the Huadian Corporation is the
largest shareholder of the YHNHD, and it was reported that Huadian estimated Yunnan
provincial government could gain a 1.3 billion yuan annual return 151. The considerable
profit from hydropower development resulted in Huadian becoming aggressive and
active in arguing for the implementation of the NRP, and this also explains why the
provincial government was an important proponent of the project.
Table 3.5 – Allocation of Share of YHNHD
Name of Enterprise Shareholders
Huadian Corporation
Yunnan Investment Group
Yunnan Electric Group Hydropower
Construction Ltd.
Nujiang River Electricity Company

Proportion of Share
51%
20%
19%
10%

Source: Tong Zhifang, ‗Structure of Mobilization and Development of Natural Protection Movement –
Case Study in Nujiang River Anti-dam Movement‘ (Dongyuan Jiegou yu Zhiran Baoyu Yundong de
fazhan – yi Nujiang Fanba Yundong weili), Open Times (Kaifang Shidai)207 (Sep, 2009): 118

Nonetheless, some ministries do not seem to devote time and resources to dam
construction, except state-owned electricity companies. However, the NDRC are
apparently less devoted to the NRP, because it also considers the potential social issues,
such as resettlement, social unrests and corruption which are associated with the launch
of these types of projects. Different to the past, NDRC seemed to consider other aspects
on this economic development; therefore, it is not surprising that NDRC is more
deliberating with regards to the NRP.
In contrast, the weaker SEPA needed to forgo more effort to shape the policy
making. The embarrassing position of ministries which stood against the project such as
SEPA is noteworthy. On the one hand, they should maintain the unified images of the
decision in the ‗collective‘ centre, and on the other, they need to fight to achieve their
interests in the policy. They failed to work directly with social organizations and
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individual activists, yet they obstructed the supporting coalitions as they possessed a
huge amount of empirical data which seemed to disadvantage the project and the
centre‘s strong legitimacy in the public domain 152 . Also, they uphold the unique
environmental value of the Nujiang region and demonstrate how the NRP contradicted
the objectives of reserving the Sanjiang Binliu. Apart from educating and persuading
potential individuals who were to be relocated in the project, they also informally allied
with ENGOs to put pressure on the central leadership to suspend the NRP 153. In order to
pressure the leadership effectively, environmental agencies also stirred up nationwide
controversy about the project, in raising the arguments of how the project is
incompatible with the new environmental law which came into forced in September
2003154 . All works of the opposition proposed to call on the concerns of the public,
especially in specific issues such as resettlement, environmental damage and social
equality. Subsequently, they seemed to have become major obstacles that the provincial
government needed to overcome in order to complete the project.
On the other hand, the supporting authorities were not willing to blindly
demonstrate their favor to the project, even if the project could bring a huge amount of
economic benefit to the organs themselves. Thus, they delegated some important
responsibilities, such as promoting the project to the public, legitimatizing the necessity
of the project, and even constructing precise content in the plan of the project to the local
governments. Yet, the centre would still act as the largest investor for a range of dam
construction projects, but the procedure of capital injection needed to be more rigorous.
According to Ma Jun, Director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, the
centre would not inject any capital into projects until they were ‗unquestionably
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approved‘155. In other words, the centre wanted more deliberation over dam construction
so as to achieve the balance of economic development and environmental protection.
The ‗Open up the West‘ campaign in 1999 aims to narrow down the income
disparity between this region and the coastal region. The campaign is an opportunity of
change and development for Yunnan which is at the most South-western end of the
territory and one of the resource-richest provinces in China. However, the lengthy
history of being inferior and destitute led to great ambition of the Yunnan provincial
government to improve the economic performance and it proposed diverse tactics of
poverty relief 156 . The Nu River Project is one of the major projects purposed for
achieving this goal by the Yunnan government. Nevertheless, comments of the central
government seemed to be less fascinated of the dam construction. Subsequently, the
NRP from the leadership seems to be more neutral, especially after considering the
environmental and ecological damages that the project will bring. The decision of the
necessity of NRP, according to Mertha, was made in 1999 by the NDPC. The Huadian
Group, which is one of the largest state-owned electricity enterprises in China, was a
major developer and operator of the TGP and took part in the project four years later 157.
However, despite their participation, their efforts in promoting the project seemed to be
mentioned less throughout the controversy of the project.
In the meantime, civil society might act as a check-and-balance mechanism to
the increasingly mighty local governments, and rather than mere critics against national
reform158. Social organizations may thus be responsible in mitigating drawbacks derived
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from these problems. For opponents, SOs are faithful and mighty allies to reshape public
opinions towards the project. In the case of the NRP, civic groups highlighted a blind
spot in the midst of the policy which the authorities might neglect, and they questioned
the project and its incompatibility with the new environmental law. In addition, their
additional information gained from assessing the project gave the SEPA an ability to
argue against the project. The opponent apparatus and social organizations
coincidentally had delineation of responsibilities. Environmental social organizations,
which were against dam construction, made enormous contributions to constructing and
broadening horizontal networks of opposition campaigns; opponent ministries, on the
other hand, due to the help of particularly outstanding cadres inside, could amplify the
opposition voices against the project while there was no consensus within central
government159. A de facto alliance was formed between a part of central authorities and
social organizations; This de facto alliance proved to be effective in shaping the policy
making process of China and altering the consequence of unpopular decisions. Beyond a
direct contest with the authorities, they recognized the bureaucratic cleavages and
‗support [of] one department to oppose another,‘160 thus, the differentiation of policy
interests amongst ministries and commissions is the core dynamic of maintaining the
cohesiveness of the organization. In spite of the successful experience of altering the
result of the NRP, it is not sufficient to conclude that the alliance of social organizations
and central authorities was well-established and institutionalized.
In short, after analyzing the political contexts and circumstances of the central
leadership and bureaucratic organs at the central level, in the decision making periods of
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the TGP and NRP, one may conclude that the central leadership seems to be the most
determinant actor throughout the decision making processes. Nonetheless, the strategies,
actions and responsibilities of the central leadership were demonstrated to have
undergone significant transformation. In the following section, rationales of these
transformations will be explained and the correlation of personnel transformation and
these transformations will be analyzed. It is argued that the transformation of the notion
of ‗development‘ in the mindset of central leaders, and in particular the Prime Minister,
exists and influences the success of mega projects, such as TGP and NRP. In spite of the
great determination of the central leadership, the leverage seemed to, in the meantime,
be restrained by the fragmented bureaucracy. Additionally, the interest fragmentation
amongst agencies had become more distinct and apparent, so the restrains of central
leadership had thereby become more embarrassing. It constructed solid obstruction and
procrastination towards successful implementation of policy. Therefore, in order to deal
with the situation and allocate agencies‘ interests more impartially, the central leadership
tends to deliberate or passively shelve the NRP proposal instead of seeking consensus
among agencies.
Transformation of Leadership & Change of Attitude?
Comparing analyses of these two projects from the perspective of the central
leadership, one might conclude that the attitude of central leaders towards dams have
evolved to be more deliberating. However, this conclusion is not sufficient to explain the
scope of evolution since it concentrates on a part of it. The personnel succession in this
decade should be included in analyses since the rationales of policy formulation in the
central leadership have changed continuously. The table 3.6 has indicated these
transformations.
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Table 3.6 – Evolvement of Rationales of Agenda Setting and Policy Formulation for
Central Leadership
13th Standing
Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP
(1989-1992)

15th Standing
Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP
(1997-2002)

17th Standing
Committee of the
Politburo of the CCP
(2002-2007)

Instructional
Ideological
Slogun(s)

‗Reform for interior,
Opening for
exterior‘ (duinei
gaige, duiwai
kaifang)

Three
Representatives of
CCP

‗Scientific
Development‘ &
‗Harmonious Society‘

Considerations of
Agenda Setting

 Sustainability or  Sustainability of
reinforcement of
rapid economic
political
growth162
legitimacy of
 Reinforcing the
161
CCP
reliability and
 Stable personnel
efficiency of the
succession of the
government and
leadership
economy
 Success of
economic
liberalization,
e.g. privatization
of SOEs,
Financial
Reforms, WTO
accession, etc163.
 Repressive
 Strong and
leadership and
repressive
weak opposition
economic &
 Ideological
bureaucratic
embellishment
reforms166

Governance Style

161

 Disparities and
injustice in the
society due to
economic
liberalization
 Drawbacks of
globalization, e.g.
economic
instability, etc.164
 Serious rentseeking activities
and bribery in the
hierarchy165

 Showing to close
to the
grassroots167
 Strong pragmatic
image and
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 Mighty central
government to
consolidate
mechanisms

of policies

Background of
Power Possession

 1989 Tiananmen
Massacre &
wave of
democratization
in Soviet Union
hampering the
legitimacy of the
CCP169
 Great anxiety of
economic
liberalization in
the leadership
(e.g. Deng‘s tour
in the Southern
China in 1992)

 Reinforcing the
pace of
economic
growth in high
speed
 Rapid economic
growth and
serious social
legacies

entrepreneurliked style168

 Successful WTO
accession and
related economic
reforms170
 Emergence of the
necessity of
social policies171
 Waves of
collective
incidents and
anti-bureaucratic
activities
throughout the
whole country172

In 2002, the CCP experienced another personnel transformation of the central leadership
after the 16th National Congress. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao became the President and
the Prime Minister to replace Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji respectively. This personnel
transformation represented an evolution of political philosophy of the administration,
and especially the attitude towards dam construction. According to the table 3.6, the
leadership devoted actively for industrialization and modernization, especially Zhu
Rongji who stressed the bureaucratic reforms and enhancement of efficiency in the
economy and bureaucracy, so they were seemingly favour of dam construction.
Surprisingly, despite their common background of being well-educated in engineering
disciplines, the Hu-Wen administration – unlike their predecessors – claimed to be
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indifferent to hydroelectricity development 173. The new-coming administration did not
deny the importance of energy supply for the development of the economy, but it had
been more indifferent to the necessity of dam construction – especially gigantic projects
such as TGP – and to the diversification of energy supply. This change could be evinced
by the increasing stress of wind, solar and other renewables rather than hydroelectricity,
in the 11th Five-Year Plan of China. Moreover, the low-profile celebration for
completion of the TGP queerly contrasted the heavy efforts of embellishment of
justifying the project by the previous administration174. The value of hydroelectricity in
the central leadership was thereby believed to be delegated more deliberately.
Prior to the succession of Hu and Wen, Heggelund suggested this argument in
2001. He especially concentrated on the transformation of premiership and exemplified
with diverse orientations between Li Peng to Zhu Rongji so as to demonstrate the
transformation of political attitude towards the leadership in relation to dam construction.
Li who was the Prime Minister of the State Council during the late 1980s and early
1990s was a prominent supporter of dam construction. Apart from proposing the TGP,
he also became one of the important defenders of the project. Zhu was more critical of
the project. Instead of directly criticizing the validity of the project, Zhu allowed mass
media and commentators to highlight significant problems encountered in the project175.
In the previous section, the critical position of the central leadership in policy making
processes of both projects has been identified. The supreme determinacy of leadership is
not only the consequence of the hierarchal superiority of leadership, but also its
173
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possession of information and professional knowledge 176 . Leaders, assisted by think
tanks and consultative intellectuals, might be able to achieve consensus among various
bureaucratic apparatus and to produce rational and qualified decisions177. Moreover, he
also argued that the improvement of academic backgrounds of leaders might probably
evolve the orientation of decision making to be more realistic and pragmatic.
During the policy planning of TGP, the central leadership was more autocratic
and dynamical to the successful implementation of the project despite occasional
hesitations from the leaders. Mass media, bureaucratic apparatus and state-owned
enterprises were main agents that implemented policies and followed leaders without
any challenge. Thus, policies were criticized to be of poor quality and ‗going out of
shape‘ (zou yang le) 178 ; yet, any unfavorable reports were prohibited in China. In
addition, ideological slogans and propaganda were still being utilized to mobilize people
and civil society to commit to the project and comfort the discontent of resettlers.
Subsequently, at the beginning of the policy making process, the media played the role
of ‗guiding public opinion‘ towards the project 179. However, the quality of policies was
not guaranteed and civilians, in particular resettled people in the project, were victimized.
For example, it was reported that thousands of rural migrants had moved back to their
lands because they were struggling with local people after relocating to other
provinces180. Besides, researchers were questioned as to the accuracy of official data and
estimates about the project. The World Bank accelerated the estimated total number of
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resettlers to be 1.4 million because the Chinese official estimates did not include
secondary resettlers and figures were underestimated using the Hukou system181.
The autocratic method of implementation changed to one that was more
transparent and realistic during Zhu and Wen‘s premierships, with more realistic news
and even scandals discovered in the midst of their tenures. Heggelund cited the
publication of four articles of the People‘s Daily – the tongue post (mouth piece) of the
CCP – which called on the leadership to be concerned the different issues raised by the
project. This reflects the gradual release of the party‘s grip in manipulating the mass
media in relation to the TGP. As a result, Zhu‘s transparency was highly praised, and
there was one comment that
‗[i]f it were not for Zhu Rongji, it would be impossible to
show the state of affairs for the project.182‘
On the other hand and in the case of the NRP, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced
that he was going to suspend the project in response to fierce controversies in society,
and the policy making process seems to have been more transparent. In addition to the
diversification of policy interests among central authorities, the process had even
become more transparent and free for expression. For instance, the public hearing by the
SEPA in November 2005 is rare in authoritarian China, as to have such open platform to
collect public opinion is not usual practice 183.
Heggelund explained the difference of orientation in the central leadership that
‗[a] main difference between the revolutionary
leaders of the first and second generations and the
technocrats of the third generation (i.e. Leadership
led by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji) is that they are
181
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problem-solvers by training; ―they focus on
problems, not ‗isms‘184.
The transformation of central leadership contributed to a well-educated and pragmatic
leadership, and may thus lead to an intention for resolving and preventing problems.
Thus, this might explain why the central leadership seems to be more deliberating and
indifferent to gigantic dam construction projects.
Although the technocratic trend of the leadership, the rapid transformation of
political background of power possession in this decade brought more diverse agenda
setting of the central leadership. Referring to the table 3.6 (sees p.71-72), the
concentration of the central leadership in agenda setting has gone beyond economic
development and included a series of social issues in the grand strategy, such as, antibribery, environmental protection and social justice, for the Hu-Wen administration.
Enormous dam construction was viewed to deteriorate social problems and challenge the
governance of the CCP. Thus, the central leadership has evolved to be more indifferent
for large-scale hydro-electricity project.
In short, after analyzing the TGP and NRP from the centre‘s perspective, one
might contrast the political significance of TGP and NRP which seems to be one of the
main reasons contributing to the diverse consequences of these two projects. However,
the TGP should not only be regarded as a pure economic project, as it was highly praised
by leaders due to its unique historical values and the arduous political atmosphere in
China after the June-Fourth Massacre. As a consequence, the TGP could become a
symbol of modernization and technological advancement in contemporary China which
may consolidate the legitimacy of CCP. On the contrary, the political significance of
NRP does not seem to be as high as the TGP in the central perspective, especially after
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the anxiety over environmental and ecological problems had resurfaced. Moreover, the
central authorities have been pluralized in accordance with diverse policy interests, so
the NRP was easily obstructed and challenged. Beyond the approach of assessing the
legitimacy of the project, this chapter has demonstrated and analyzed the contextual
actions of the central leadership and authorities in the TGP and the NRP. Cleavages of
interests existed in the central government, in both leadership and ministries. Further,
this seems to correlate with the scope of economic liberalization. On the other hand, the
higher level that leaders had possessed did not only lead to technocratic tendencies in
decision making, but also explained the rationales of deliberation before decisions were
reached by the new-generation central leadership. Nevertheless, the significant
transformation is not restrained at the intra-bureaucratic level, but exists in the centreperiphery relationship. In the following chapter, the correlations of decentralization and
interest fragmentation inside the hierarchical system in China will be explained.
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Chapter 4 – Local Officials and Mega Hydropower Project: Transformation
of Interest Articulation
The extensive domain of China has caused huge diversity of environment
amongst provinces. Taking Yunnan and Hubei provinces, where the Nu River Dams and
Three Gorges Dam are respectively located, even though they are both inland provinces,
Yunnan province is inferior to Hubei in terms of economic performance; however it has
richer reserves in a range of natural resources and its relief is relatively mountainous.
Moreover, Yunnan is more ethnically diverse than other provinces. The huge diversity
of provinces thus enables local officials to sound legitimate when taking part in the
important role of policy formulation. This is because, local officials, particularly
provincial cadres, have greater political leverage than constitutional regulations. They
shoulder responsibilities of implementing policies, planning directions, and strategizing
development. In this chapter, not only will actions of provincial governments in these
projects be introduced, how localities regard mega dam projects like TGP and NRP will
also be discussed. The rationales of their praises towards these projects will also be
analyzed from the perspective of local bureaucrats. Thus, how these notions influenced
expectations and interactions with the central agencies and civil society are of concern
here. Moreover, this chapter will argue that market mechanism and local
developmentalism in the local governments, rather than ideology, have penetrated into
the calculations of local cadres. Ideology seems to have become only an instrument for
local cadres in achieving their goals, hence this chapter aims to support and even enrich
the applicability of the FA model.
Before going into the analysis of this chapter, the level of investigation should be
clearly delineated. In the contemporary Chinese polity, there are three main stories of
local-level echelon: provinces, townships/cities/prefectures and village/district levels.
Throughout this thesis, local governments generally refer to public administrative
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institutions in provincial and prefecture levels and correspondent cadres. Organs in
several autonomous areas, such as Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and
Xinjiang, also have an identical administrative position in political system of China. The
majority of cadres in these levels are positioned through the promotion, deployment or
recruitment of the extensive party membership. Moreover, different from the elected
village-level cadres, provincial and prefecture-level cadres seem to have a brighter
prospect and future of promotion to the central leadership 185 . For instance, both
President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping have rich experience of working as
general secretaries in provincial party committees 186 . Additionally, regardless of the
patterns in power distribution, the provincial government‘s role cannot be eliminated187
and it is viewed as having an identical ranking with ministries in the centre. As a result,
a governor in a province will generally have a similar status with a minister of the centre
in Chinese administrative hierarchical system

188

. Thus, their interactions and

expectations with civil society and central agencies are main foci of this chapter.
Due to the diverse geographical and cultural varieties of these provinces, the
central government failed to implement economic policies with absolute uniformity.
Local governments were gradually allowed to implement a range of economic policies
in their willingness to boost the economies of their domains. Decentralization of
authority altered responsibilities and relationships between the centre and peripheries.
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Further, it also implies the provision of a platform for local officials to have greater
political leverage, as they are no longer mere agents of the centre who will stick to its
directions and guidelines as many of them were in 1950s. Lieberthal uncovered the
reality of the degradation of power that ‗[a]lthough Beijing (i.e. the centre) retains
important resources to bring provinces to heel, provincial leaders often evade orders that
are not quite specific and are not given high priority by the national leaders 189 .‘ Li
elaborated the situation as
‗[r]ather than merely responding to central
demands, provincial leaders mobilized substantial
resources for their own use. Their lower status in
the state hierarchy might have made them the
weaker partner of the bargaining relationship with
the Centre. However, despite the disparity in
theoretical power, the provinces have shown
themselves to have no small measure of power in
their own right 190.‘
Thus seen, provincial leaders also enjoyed the authority of economic policies
formulation, and they could initiate policies in accordance with their own interests and
visions. Besides, they have also been able to ‗influence national policy informally
through their reactions to central directive‘ 191 . However, this may not represent the
deterioration of the authority of the central leadership.
The emphasis of economic and social development in the post-Mao period has
highlighted an imbalanced domination of economic development in the agenda of
provincial leaders. From their viewpoint, mega dam projects are opportunities to attract
capital injection for the provinces beyond improving infrastructure facilities in the
domain. Particularly in the cases of TGP and NRP, reservoir areas in these projects are
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located in poverty-struck regions of China. Thus, local leaders frequently claimed that
the projects and their respective resettlement campaigns could encourage the economies
and to develop, or indeed improve environment and accessibility of these regions; in
other words, mega project were viewed as a way of poverty alleviation. This chapter will
investigate how these projects were considered by localities as means to develop
economies of their paddocks.

Localities in TGP – enforcement and specific decision
Since fiscal decentralization in the reform era, provincial leaders were
enthusiastic of developing industrial levels within their paddocks. As an illustration, it
was reported that some provincial governments imposed ‗protectionist policies‘ on
‗inter-provincial trade‘ in order to protect their industries and economies 192. The great
and mercantilist enthusiasm of provincial leaders uncovered interest and political clashes
between provinces. Thus, mega projects such as the TGP, in the perspective of local
officials, could not be simply regarded as economic policy alone. This is because they
would be an arena of bargaining for leaders to lobby, amplify, and fight for interests of
various provinces as well as their own. Therefore, this could reflect increasing interest
differentiation between provinces. In Graph 4-1, the structure of governmental
institutions that was adopted in TGP management is shown and provincial governments
were responsible for institutionalizing, planning and managing resettlement. They need
to coordinate resource, workload and responsibility allocation amongst local
governments at the lower level. Besides, in order to facilitate the completion of the
project, local governments mobilized state-owned enterprises and township-village
enterprises in their domains in order to invest in reservoir area. For instance, Zigui
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county and Badong county, which are located in Hubei province and encountered
resettlement on a similar scale, offered tax exemption. Also, Zigui even offered the
return of added-value tax to enterprises in order to tempt more capital investment in
different industries of the local economies 193 . As a consequence, this section will
concentrate on the realm that provincial governments were involved with the most:
resettlement194.
Resettlement Campaign
Resettlement was portrayed as the most difficult and complicated part of the
entire TGP campaign195, and local governments generally acted as agents to follow and
actualize the vision and planning of the centre in the project. According to Graph 4-1,
local governments shouldered the responsibilities of planning, managing and inspecting
the relocation process of the project, as well as establish relevant administrative organs
which specialized in handling all issues incurred in the relocation campaign. The project
could thus be eventually completed on time. Also, due to the simultaneity of
resettlement and construction works, as well as the significant relocation population, the
difficulties of resettlement were accelerated. However, responsibilities of provinces
would substantially vary according to the flow of individuals relocating. For instance,
the reservoir provinces and the host provinces‘ responsibilities were substantially
different. Referring to Graph 4-1 (sees p.98), the State Council would oversee the whole
project while provincial governments would be responsible for managing the flow of
resettlement. Nevertheless, for reservoir provinces, i.e. Chongqing-Sichuan and Hubei,
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they would manage the distribution of compensation to resettlers and also mobilize
affected residents. For the host provinces, they were in charge of receiving relocatees
and provided inter-provincial investments to reservoir area. The differentiation in
substantial responsibilities amongst provinces led to the fragmentation of stances for the
TGP amongst provinces.
Sichuan was a good example of not favoring the TGP. The opposition was the
consequence of considering the inundation area of reservoir area and the considerable
cost of resettlement. Before the elevation of Chongqing‘s administrative status in 1997,
provincial leaders in Chengdu were afraid to shoulder too heavy burden of resettlements,
and other development projects in the province would most probably be influenced or
even suspended 196 . As a result, Sichuan‘s enthusiasm for the project was apparently
conditional and limited. Provincial officials were subsequently enthusiastic towards
supporting and preparing the proposal for a lower dam in the initial stage of the project
planning197. The high dam would bring about a larger reservoir area and more people
would thereby be relocated, so the burden of Chengdu might be heavier. Nonetheless, it
was reported that a new administrative entity would be created out of Sichuan and would
bear the responsibilities for resettlement, instead of Sichuan198. The stance of Sichuan
seemed to be softened and, in the end, Chongqing and the suburb around was escalated
into a municipality in 1997, which is tantamount to provincial level 199.
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Lampton argued that the political process was the consequence of lengthy
consultation and negotiation amongst bureaucratic organs, rather the simple and
unilateral command from the central leadership 200 . For example, notwithstanding the
strong enthusiasm of completing the TGP from the central leadership, localities were not
fully willing to follow the centre with absolute compliance. This was because the fiscal
decentralization allowed provincial governments to develop their own economic policies
without the centre‘s approval. Provincial leaders focused on economic development of
provinces that they serve rather than of the whole country, or other provinces, when they
decided the strategies of economic development of the provinces. Accordingly, there
were confrontational strategies amongst provinces. The strategy differentiation might
imply interest fragmentation amongst provinces albeit the common target of developing
local economies. On the other hand, the economic liberalization awakened the
perception of departmental interests of bureaucrats, and most probably clash with
localities‘ strategy of economic development. This differentiation brought apparent
cleavages in the decision making between the centre and the peripheries such as in
Sichuan‘s case. Subsequently, it was necessary for the centre to coordinate the diverse
interests of provinces and to bargain with provincial leaders in order to achieve
consensus in the hierarchy. Therefore, it sought to have an efficient decision making but
the time of to make political decision would be lengthened 201. Referring to Sichuan‘s
anxiety in TGP, Chongqing‘s escalation from prefectural to municipal level in 1997,
which is directly administrated by the centre and enjoys the identical echelon of
provinces in the hierarchal system of China, was viewed as an instrument of seeking for
agreement to high-meter dam construction from Chengdu. 202 . Eventually, Sichuan
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became another host province responsible for absorbing distant resettlers from the
reservoir area.
On the other hand, the great challenge of resettlement that was brought to the
project was not only the vast population of affected people, but also in essence the
uprooting of livelihoods and high risk impoverishment. In addition, tragedies in Chinese
resettlement history highlighted the significance of resettlement. 203 As a result, the
center proposed regulations and policies of development-oriented resettlement in order
to promise the maintenance of resettlers‘ livelihoods after relocation. This was presented
in the official regulations for resettlement campaigns, issued in 2001:
‗[i]n the Three Gorges Project construction, the
development-oriented
residents-resettlement
guideline shall be enforced, under which the
residents-resettlement funds shall be used in an
overall way, …and the residents to be resettled
properly relocated to ensure that their working and
living conditions reach or surpass their previous
level and that favourable conditions are created for
the economic and social development in the Three
Gorges reservoir area.‘204
‗[t]he people‘s governments and the people in the
Three Gorges Project inundated areas or in the
residents-resettlement areas shall take the interests
of the whole into account, be subordinated to the
State overall management, and properly handle the
relationship between residents – resettlement and
economic development.‘205
However, interest diversity amongst provinces, which would hamper the
effectiveness of policies and promises from the center, could not be attained. Therefore,
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this may be a probable consequence of the unfavorable perception of resettlers by
provincial leaders. Thus, provincial leaders of both reservoir areas and host provinces
were more likely to welcome dam construction, since it would bring a huge amount of
capital to help local economic and social development. Yet, they were necessary in order
to tackle the thousands of ordinary people who were relocated to their residential
locations that were inundated. In addition, resettlers found it difficult to establish new
livelihoods in resettled areas and some found it challenging to get along with the host
population. Accordingly, it was necessary for provinces to prepare more public
discussion and allocate a certain proportion of the budget and personnel resources to
handle the adaptation of the resettlers, as well as being ready for possible confrontation
with the host population. 206 For Hubei and Chongqing, the overwhelming majority of the
population living in the reservoir area was poor, unskilled, and low-educated. Thus,
cultivation was the exclusive channel for individuals to generate an income and support
their families. The dam was associated with the loss of considerable hectares of
farmland or arable land that would be inundated. Subsequently, local authorities
proposed the transfer of thousands of rural relocatees into secondary and tertiary
industries, as well as moving into urban areas in order to improve relocatees‘ material
livelihoods.207
Nevertheless, hundreds of enterprises – including SOEs, township-village
enterprises (TVEs), and those privately owned – were terminated due to the considerable
cost incurred in resettlement and their weakness of competing in the market.
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Notwithstanding the 7000-RMB compensation from the authorities, considerable TVEs
were terminated and went bankrupt due to the limited improvement of competitiveness
after the relocation.208 Hence, the excessive labor force could not be effectively absorbed.
For instance, in the Yunyang county of Hubei province, approximately 60 percent of
peasants-turned-workers were unable to work in a factory, after being promised by the
local cadres. Therefore, the ideal planning of the center and localities could not be
actualized. 209 Subsequently, there seemingly was an apparent shortfall of visions
between the central and provincial governments – for both reservoir and host provinces;
and this shortfall would be associated with the discontent and grievance of those affected.
Ordinary people gathered and fought for their interests through collective actions and
even violence. In addition to the frequent scandals of corruption and bribe at local level,
many blamed local cadres for obstructing progress and the vision demonstrated by
central leaders. 210 Thus, the hostility between local cadres and ordinary people has
sharpened, and in 2000 Kaixian county saw a devastating collective incident. Thousands
of resettlers destroyed buildings, infrastructure and facilities, contested with local cadres
and were even violent in expressing their discontent against the government‘s
assignment of their accommodation. In the end, troops had to be deployed to disperse
resettlers.211
In the perspective of local cadres in the reservoir area, the TGP have an
uncommon political significance, in that
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‗… [a]ll local officials know that their careers
depend on saying what the center wants to hear.
Hence it is hardly surprising that many local
officials have kept any reservations about the
project to themselves, while the less upright among
them try to advance their careers by participating
in deceit.‘212

In other words, the smooth completion of the resettlement campaign was believed to
guarantee the brighter future of promotion and greater political leverage. Thus, despite a
range of limitations and weaknesses in the resettlement program, officials needed to pay
enormous political costs to counter the project or to challenge the decision of the central
leadership. Hence, many were willing to follow central instructions in mobilizing,
encouraging or even forcing citizens to resettle. Still, as Li mentioned, the unique
political status of provincial governments in the hierarchy provided a solid guarantee of
political and administrative leverage for provincial officials. 213 The central authorities
were unable to thoroughly implement the resettlement program without local
government help, and the differentiation of strategies between the center and local
authorities hampered the effectiveness of policies. Therefore, this subsequently led to a
variety of humanitarian crises in the reservoir areas and resettlement villages throughout
the country.214

Localities in NRP – Planning, enforcement and promoter
Different from being agents of implementation in the TGP, localities acted as a
major dynamic force of the NRP a decade later, and hydropower development was
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considered a critical component of the ‗Open up the West‘ campaign announced in 1999.
However, before the national planning of hydropower was made by the center, the
Yunnan government expressed its eagerness to develop hydroelectricity, in conjunction
with eco-tourism and ethnically cultural promotion, to become the ‗pillars‘ of economic
development of the province.215 In other words, beyond traditionally recognizing pillar
industries for economic development, the Yunnan provincial government had a mixture
of motivations to encourage hydroelectricity development.
Contradictory Actions
In chapter 2, the scarce landscape of Sanjiang Biliu, which refers to the parallel
runoffs of the Nu, the Mekong-Lancang River and the Jinsha-Yangtze River, which are
in the same region (located in North-western Yunnan), was briefly introduced. This
region has also been recognized to be a ‗World Heritage‘ site by UNESCO. Also,
Mertha pointed out that the conjunction of both terrain and recognition was a typical
illustration of the dilemmatic contest between economic development and environmental
protection.
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He, however, over-simplified the controversy and neglected its

implications towards Yunnan provincial leaders. In Litzinger‘s article, he claimed that
Yunnan had introduced the idea of a ‗great ethnic cultural province,‘ which had the
purpose of promoting the tourist values and uniqueness of Yunnan.
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Thus,

paradoxically, both the approval of natural ‗World Heritage‘ and the plan of NRP seem
to be alternative strategies of provincial leaders to encourage economic development.
Fiscal decentralization, as mentioned above, encouraged the shift of responsibilities of
provincial leaders toward rapid economic growth. Thus, successful economic
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improvements in the paddock might have brought about better political prospects to the
provincial leaders. Unfortunately, the ethnic context in Yunnan was no more or less
complicated than in other parts of China, and they are particularly complex in the
Western part of the province. Consequently, provincial officials are thought to have a
strong perception of having a balanced geographical economic development and prevent
the disparity of benefit among different races. Hence, they proposed to develop the Nu
River area via the NRP and looked to enrich the material livelihoods of the ethnic
minorities in the area, without eroding the cultural uniqueness of these minority groups.
Based on these predispositions, provincial officials might thus be frequently perceived
as being over-reliant on economic development. Further, the announcements amplified
the controversy about the NRP. In June 2003, Yunnan television revealed the
establishment of a new hydropower development corporation financed by the
consortium and headed by China Huadian Corporation and the Yunnan Development
Investment Company, with a plan to exploit the hydropower potential in the upper
reaches of the Nu River. One month later, UNESCO announced its approval of the
Sanjiang Biliu site to become part of the World Heritage Sites.218 Environmentalists or
dam opponents criticized the Yunnan provincial government for being contradictory on
the unique environment of Sanjiang Biliu. Unfortunately, the close simultaneity of these
two events was more likely to be in consequence of unconscious coincidence: they
happened independently but the simultaneous announcements seemingly ‗linked them
up.‘ The ‗linkage,‘ therefore, could amplify the argument of anti-dam activisms, such as
Yu Xiaogang and Wang Yongchen.
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In sum, the general role of local leaders has been more aggressive and active in
the decision making processes of the TGP and the NRP, whereas the motives have
remained to emphasize economic development in the provinces. In the 1990s, localities
were still acting as an agent for implementing and mobilizing those affected and became
relevant for entities following central instructions. In particular, with inter-provincial
investment and resettlements, localities shouldered the most critical part of practices
including mobilizing, planning practices, managing, and resolving any legacies. They
were working on the frontline while the central leadership, through various
administrative apparatuses, was issuing a range of directions, visions and ideologies in
Beijing. In spite of the presence of interest fragmentation, localities would never openly
challenge the central leadership. For instance, they would never criticize the feasibility
of TGP. This may be due to the strong eagerness toward the project of the center, and
the expected conjunction of the smooth completion of the project and their political
prospects. However, they would try to bargain with the center in order to maximize their
interests or minimize their responsibilities. Uncommonly, localities acted more
dominantly in the decision making process of NRP. The NRP‘s planning was initiated
by the Yunnan provincial government as the response of the ‗Open up the West‘
Campaign established in the eve of new millennium. It shouldered the planning,
mobilizing and promoting responsibilities of the project. On the other hand, the
announcement in quick succession of the planning of the NRP and the recognition of
World Heritage of the Sanjiang Biliu site, in 2003, amplified the controversy and
consolidated arguments against the NRP. Thus, the co-existence may hamper the
legitimacy of the NRP and cause the provincial government to plan recklessly and
introduce paradoxical strategies of economic development.
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Bargaining in the Decision-making Process
To Centre: Restrained Bargaining Partner
As mentioned in chapter 1, the uniformity of the Chinese hierarchy was no
longer considered as absolute compared to that of the Mao period. In the past, the
coercion of the state was highly emphasized and the Leninist central-periphery
relationship was completely asymmetrical. Thus, some provincial governments may
only be mere followers of the centre. Ideology has played an important role in
mobilizing officials, ordinary citizens and other entities in the country to follow central
instruction. Currently, provincial governments may express negative opinions on
policies proposed by the center, so as to articulate their local interests. The centralprovincial relationship seemed to be transformed from being radically center-oriented to
increasingly provincial-oriented, and the leverages of social mobilization and ideology
also deteriorated. Therefore, we ask: what factors have become dominant in policy
making in China, and in particular when developing mega projects? And, how would
these changes of provinces influence the relationship with the center? These questions
will be addressed in this section through a comparison of the general findings from the
actions of provincial governments in the TGP and NRP.
The importance of provincial leaders should not be explained only in an
administrative sense, but further explained in both economic and political senses.
Provincial leaders – governors and the general secretary of the party in provinces – were
not the paramount of the vast hierarchal system. However, the great diversity amongst
provinces provides ample administrative, economic and political advantage for
provincial leaders, and decentralization further underlines these advantages. Generally
speaking, they possessed these advantages owing to the intermediary essence of
provincial leaders between the central authorities and local people. These advantages
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highlight the center‘s lack of information about local situations, the local governments‘
abilities for allocating fiscal revenue to the center, and in declaring the content of ‗local
interest.‘ Referring to table 4.2, in an administrative sense, due to the significant and
diverse population in China, the central authorities were incapable of implementing
policies with absolute coercion. In the ‗Great Leap Forward‘ campaign, as an illustration,
the ideological embellishment and mass mobilization of the center for ambitious
development of industrialization and modernization brought inefficient productivity,
common poverty, and devastating famine throughout the country. The central authorities
needed provincial governments to provide local information in various aspects in order
to prevent similar mistakes as those in the ‗Great Leap Forward‘ campaign. Besides, in
the traditional quasi-federal context, provincial governments should allocate a
proportion of revenue as a contribution to the center. In China‘s case, economic reforms,
including the fiscal reform in 1980 (known as fenzhao chifan219 ), allowed provincial
governments to plan their budgets and issue their budgetary targets. The obligations of
provinces were to allocate part of the revenue or surplus to the central authorities.220
Consequently, provincial governments may thus have adequate fiscal or budgetary
resources for economic development, and the central government may not be able to
restrain the power of provincial leaders through ‗wallet power‘ in an economic sense.
On the other hand, in a political sense, the role of provincial leaders should not be
simplified as representatives of the party or the government in provinces; they are also
‗the creators of provincial interests,‘221 which implies that they could enunciate local
interests in various political discourse. Yet, this unique leverage may possibly
219
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legitimatize their priorities for unfavorable policies in the eyes of ordinary people. Thus,
the autocratic center was unlikely to completely eliminate the necessity of a presence
from the local governments. These three leverages could also be illustrated by the TGP
and NRP, as shown in the table 4.2.
Table 4.2 – Three Leverages of Provincial Leaders
Leverages of
Provincial
Leaders

Rationales

Impacts for the center

Illustration in TGP
or NRP (case
specified)

Administrative

The central
authorities failed
to access
considerable
local information
without the help
of provincial
apparatuses.

Restrained by
information contributed
by provincial
governments to formulate
directions and nationwide
policies.

Allowance of
constructing
practices of
resettlement
campaign for local
governments (TGP).

Economic

The central
government
allowed
provinces to
construct their
own budgets and
share a certain
proportion of the
revenue/surplus.

Loss of ‗wallet power‘ in
the bargaining or
negotiation with
provinces.

Sichuan‘s opposition
for a high-dam
proposal (TGP).

Political

Provincial
governments
could articulate
local interests
according to
leaders‘
perceptions.

Ample room for
provincial governments
to going off or even
violate central directions
or instructions.

Earlier proposal of
dam construction in
the Nu River before
the official
establishment of the
‗Open up the West‘
campaign (NRP).

Unfortunately, the rise of provincial governments might probably not represent
the delegation of central authority. The zero-sum assertion of the central-peripheral
‗power‘ spectrum does not suffice to explain the interest fragmentation reflecting in the
decision making process of two projects; however, it seemed to suit the autocratic
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actions and attitudes of the center in the 1980s. 222 Li described the essence of the
central-local retrospective interactions as:
‗[i]t is impossible for the Centre to win a total
victory over its intermediary. Provincial
governments are an indispensable ally of the
Centre in governance …As neither the Centre nor
the provinces could decisively win over and
eliminate the other, both were forced to
accommodate the interests of the other and to
compromise.‘223
In other words, while the central government could not have absolute authority over
replacing or neglecting the presence of provincial governments, such governments could
also never challenge or even overrule decisions made by the central government. Thus,
provincial leaders would need to remain obedient to the center, albeit their various
leverages. For instance, although the Yunnan government was allowed to formulate any
economic policy for their own economy, the NRP required the approval of the center
and related ministries at the central level. Thus, the State Council has suspended the
project for approval in 1999. Additionally, with economic decentralization and
considerable administrative reform, the core apparatuses of the contemporary Chinese
bureaucratic system remained Soviet-Leninist style, 224 which favors a mighty central
authority, and the perception of local officials seem to be dominated by conventional
Confucianism; thus implying that officials maintain their ‗sincerity, loyalty and
reliability‘ to the party. 225 Consequently, the expansion of power in the local government
was associated with decentralization, as economic reform was unlikely to link with the
222
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separatism of provinces. This phenomenon was explained as the consequence of selfrestraint and effective political control of the central government. Naughton even
described central-periphery negotiation as ‗the Centre fights with one hand tied behind
its back.‘226 In a nutshell, decentralization brought a more symmetrical center-periphery
relationship for the Chinese bureaucracy. Thus, provincial leaders were provided to
serve more critically and with greater leverage due to bureaucratic transformation.
Nonetheless, it was analyzed that provincial leaders were more likely to retain an
intimate relationship with the party leadership because of the maintenance of s Leniniststyle hierarchy and the influence of conventional Confucianist loyalty in themselves.
From the case of TGP, they would bargain or negotiate in order to maximize their ‗local
interests.‘ So, how would provincial bureaucrats interpret and fight for their ‗local
interests?‘
In retrospect, the legacies of romantic Leninist mobilization, in the ‗Great Leap
Forward‘ and Cultural Revolution periods, brought material deficiencies through the
entire country. Accordingly, there was seemingly a great consensus in the state and
society of seeking for approaches towards improving the material livelihoods of
society. 227 Due to the absence of institutions such as the bourgeoisie in the Western
society representing the interests of ordinary citizens and society in China, provincial
officials could be viewed as serving as the main representatives of local interests. Under
this backdrop, provincial officials were generally enthusiastic towards fast economic and
social development. In other words, economic development of the provinces became the
most important ‗local interest‘ perceived by provincial leaders. As a result, according to
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Zheng, a new set of ideological doctrines – ‗local developmentalism‘ – emerged in the
Chinese hierarchy.
Easterly explained ‗developmentalism‘ as a set of ideologies that asserts
‗(economic and social) development promises a comprehensive final answer to all of
society‘s problems, from poverty and illiteracy to violence and despotic rulers.‘ 228
However, his explanation initially aims to explain the phenomenon existing in
international society and could not be fully applied to the unique backdrop of China in a
post-Mao period. Given the context of economic (and even political) decentralization in
China, Zheng generalized six characteristics of ‗local developmentalism,‘ which would
be demonstrated through examples in TGP and NRP (contained in table 4.3).
Table 4.3 – Characteristics of Local Developmentalism & Examples in TGP & NRP
Characteristics229
Cooperate with the center
so as to escalate economic
development to become
the issue with the highest
priority in both national
and provincial agenda.

Examples in TGP
Promoting the advanced
development-oriented
resettlement, in which
development becomes an
instrument of resettlement
and an opportunity to
encourage resettlement to
enter another higher
level.230
Taking part in negotiation ‗Partnership Support
and bargaining with other Programme‘ (PSP) aims to
encourage the prosperous
provinces, and even
bureaucratic organs in the coastal regions to partner
with any specific counties
center, but also
in the reservoir area, so as
maintaining persistent
economic development of to provide ‗one-to-one
assistance‘ for resettlement
the provinces.
and development.231
High intention of guiding Requiring counties in
reservoir areas to recognize
provincial economies to
and develop sectors which
develop and have fast
228

Examples in NRP
Promoting and emphasizing
the objectives of the project
in improving the
accessibility and economic
development of the most
remote and ethnicallycomplex region in the
province.
Interest divergence between
the coalition‘s pro-dam
departments in the center
and the Yunnan provincial
government against antidam ministries in the center
and ENGOs.

Encouraging the
development of eco-tourism
(e.g., the recognition of

William Easterly, ‘The Ideology of Development’, Foreign Policy, no. 161 (Jul-Aug 2007): 31.
Zheng, 1995: 44-45.
230
Wu, 1999: 23.
231
McDonald, Webber & Duan, 2008:87.
229
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Three Parallel River as
Natural World Heritage)
and cultural tourism by
utilizing the diverse culture
of the ethnic minority with
the construction of NRP.233
234
N/A
20% total share of Yunnan
Direct participation in
Huadian Nujiang River
economic activities as the
Hydropower Development
role of entrepreneurship
Co. Ltd belongs to the
of provincial
Yunnan Investment Group,
governments.
which is an enterprise
directly subordinate to the
Yunnan provincial
government.235
Peasants were given more
Encouraging the
Uneven development
policies which are in favor arable land if they moved to development of eco-tourism
grow high yielding plants,
(e.g., the recognition of
of sectors that contribute
such as fruits, herbs, and tea Three Parallel River as
to the largest economic
beyond the initial land
Natural World Heritage)
growth.
compensation from the
and cultural tourism by
236
authorities.
utilizing the diverse culture
of the ethnic minority with
the construction of NRP.
Various temptation policies,
N/A238
Encouraging various
sectors and correspondent e.g. tax exemption, lower
enterprises to expand and rent or even free use of land
grow, so as to intensify the were employed to attract
enterprises from the East to
competitiveness against
invest in the reservoir
the same sectors in other
area.237
provinces.
growth.

have greater comparative
advantage as ‗pillar
sectors.‘232
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In short, decentralization provided a fertile land for the growth of ‗local
developmentalism,‘ in which economic development of provinces dominated and
influenced the reciprocal interactions between the center and provinces.

To Civil Society: Scientific Findings & Ideological Mobilization
By contrast, the attitude of provincial leaders towards civil society seemed to be
more indifferent than towards the central authorities. In the Leninist communist society,
civil society was subordinate to the mighty communist party and vast bureaucracy.
Despite the presence of a few social organizations beyond the bureaucracy, such as the
Communist Youth League, these organizations proposed an expansion of the totalitarian
leverages of the party. Economic liberalization and decentralization, since Deng‘s
administration, brought forth a flourish of social organizations or associations to
articulate a variety of interests. Besides, more intellectuals vivaciously engaged in policy
formulation through a wide range of channels. Yet, even due to the rapid emergence of
civil society, provincial governments have seemed to remain indifferent and repressive
towards contributions to civil society. Subsequently, the relationship between civil
society and provincial authorities has transformed to be more hostile. In this section, I
will argue that the hostility seems to be inevitable and increasingly violent. Moreover, it
will imply a further decline in the ideological leverage of authorities. However, the
provincial-society hostility might lead to a certain degree of civil society independence
in an administrative sense.
As previously mentioned, provincial governments were once viewed as
representative of society, owing to the absence of class or institutions such as the middle
class in the Western society in China. However, economic liberalization was
accompanied by the evolution of property ownership and improvements in material
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livelihoods. Accordingly, society has been more pluralized even though the party state
remained mighty, and such changes led to society becoming more fragmented. The
consensus of economic development, since provincial governments uphold economic
reform, seemed to be questioned. Thus, a number of civic society organizations were
established and Chinese civil society saw rapid growth. Additionally, the intellectuals in
China had been more romantic and willing to shoulder the risk of being marginalized
and punished, but uncovered the truth. The functions of intellectuals has transformed
from loyal followers of the Party or revolutionary comrades to become a unique class of
citizenship in society.239 The emergent civil society (in the forms of civic associations
and individual activists) challenged the existing representation of provincial
governments to articulate the interests of ordinary people. Subsequently, this may
probably bring hostility between these two sectors. Retrospectively, the role
confrontation between civil society and local governments could probably transform to
be more apparent, especially in rural regions. Without the help of civic voluntary
organizations, resettlers in rural areas would be more vulnerable to impoverishment;
resulting in mass rural protests and even riots after relocation. Beyond the incident in
Kaixian County, mentioned in previous section, another well-known illustration of mass
protest was in Gaoyang County, Chongqing in 1997; this originated from the discontent
of insufficient compensation of arable land after relocation and involved direct petition
against local officials to Beijing.240 Economic liberalization was more likely to awaken
political rightfulness of ordinary citizens. Thus, whether provincial governments could
retain their representativeness and intermediary essence between the centre and ordinary
people had been questioned. In particular, with their various leverages listed in table B,
239
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provincial leaders and other local leaders were frequently viewed as targets of criticism
and activism.
Nonetheless, the mutual relationship between local governments and civil society
organizations was not solely confrontational, as they tended to be interdependent in an
administrative sense. In 1998, the party leadership implemented administrative reforms
by downsizing the bureaucracy and a huge amount of nearly laid-off bureaucrats were
absorbed by social organizations, and particularly by those that had a close relationship
with the authorities. Also, the latest registration system requested social organizations to
seek a local administrative organ or professional unit as sponsoring unit and to fulfill the
cumbersome process of registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. These
administrative processes were aimed towards maintaining the growth of civil society
under the Party‘s manipulation. In the meanwhile, this enabled social organizations to
have a greater intention of retaining an intimate relationship with local governments,
since their actions were regulated and supervised by the sponsoring units. These
embedded interactions reflect the administrative interdependence of both local
governments and social organizations. As a consequence, the provincial-society
relationship should not be over-simplified as mere intimacy or hostility. On the contrary,
they were more likely to vary their attitudes toward each other so as to cope with
practical difficulties. However, this stage seems to be short and unsustainable, as the
provincial-society relationship,

generally

speaking,

was

more

likely

to

be

confrontational.
In sum, the authoritarian nature of the central leadership could not eliminate the
necessity and importance of provincial governments. The intermediary position of the
provincial governments allowed them to become a ‗contractor‘ of the center to govern
the paddocks. Besides, owing to the absence of an institutionalized and mature class or
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organ of articulating local interests, in addition to the egalitarian deficiencies of China,
provincial governments were regarded as representative of local interests. Therefore,
provincial leaders would negotiate or barter with the central authorities to maximize
local interests. In the context of economic liberalization and decentralization, provincial
leaders tended to represent the willingness of rapid economic development in localities.
Nevertheless, economic liberalization also contributed to radical, social and economic
change, and society had more likely to become fragmented and pluralized. Therefore,
the phenomenon of provincial leaders representing the ‗local interest‘ is in doubt. On the
other hand, the emergence of civic voluntary organizations may have challenged the role
of representing the local interests of provincial governments. In the following chapter,
how these organizations emerged and fought for their interests will be discussed, with
the aid of the TGP and NRP.
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Graph 4.1 – Structure of Governmental Institutions in TGP Resettlement Management
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Chapter 5 –Civil Society and Hydropower Projects: Passive Players?
In previous chapters, the importance of central authorities and local cadres has
been respectively discussed and examined. Nevertheless, concentrating on investigating
the facet of authorities is not sufficient to picture the entire scenario of decision making
about hydropower in China. This is essentially due to the emergent leverages of civil
social organizations for these mega projects. Therefore, despite the authoritarian nature
of the communist regime, social organizations (SOs, and also known as ‗civil social
organizations‘) also played critical roles in the policy making processes. In particular the
recent suspension of Nu River Project, in which SOs actively expressed their concerns
of environmental damage such a project might bring, was even regarded as a ‗victory of
civil society‘241. Therefore, this chapter will examine TGP and NRP from the activists‘
perspective and also discuss the transformation of their roles in policy making processes.
The overall situations of social organizations would first be introduced in an
effort to clarify several important concepts mentioned in this chapter, such as ‗social
organizations‘, and briefly explain the notion of civil society in the Chinese context.
Several characteristics of social organizations in China, or more accurately
environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs), will also be demonstrated to
sketch out orientations and behavioral patterns of SOs. This may facilitate an
understanding over the palpable transformation of SOs for the TGP and NRP.
Throughout investigating the actions and contributions of SOs in both projects, this
chapter will demonstrate that the influence of social organizations in China should not
be neglected or underestimated; as they have already been one of major contributors in
the policy making process in China. In the meantime, their leverages, however, should
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not be exaggerated as having the opportunity to challenge the central leadership. SOs in
China were unlikely to have any intention to challenge the central authorities. Although
there might be more confrontations in the state-society relationship, SOs seemed to
remain awed by the central leadership and reluctant to directly challenge the central
leadership. In addition, they had behaved in a more strategic and out-going manner
through cooperating with the mass media and establishing networks with international
alliances, in order to amplify their leverages and lobby for their interests. In essence, this
chapter will argue that SOs were able to fulfill their social responsibilities, but were
unable to bring any political leverage to become more aggressive and radical. In other
words, they were able to put pressure on the central leadership through a series of
strategic promotion, activities and alliances, but they may not have been able to satisfy
political functions to establish an independent and autonomous relationship from the
party state. Alternatively, this chapter will argue that these entities are still not sufficient
to determine the success or failure of hydropower development projects in China.
However, before providing any analysis, a definition of social organizations and other
important concepts should be clarified.
Traditionally, social scientists interpret civil society organizations in accordance
with two senses. In the sociological sense, the essence of civil society is as an
intermediate entity between state and ordinary people. Hence, civil society organizations
should highlight a range of social problems encountered by ordinary people and provide
material, knowledge or personnel resources in support. On the other hand, the
independent nature of civil society from the state has been emphasized in the political
sense. Civil society organizations were viewed as entities that enjoyed autonomy and
operated without any intervention from the authorities, and that the state-society
relationship should be on a basis of important political notions, such as citizenship,
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legitimacy and representation242. This implies a responsibility for representing ordinary
people in order to lobby their various interests, such as rightfulness, justices and even
power, by reshaping the policies or even denying the existing regime. Nevertheless, civil
society had generally been subordinate to, or manipulated by, the party state in China.
After achieving power in 1949, the communist party constructed a vast bureaucratic
network in the civil society and cracked down on numerous civic organizations in the
rural area, such as temples, ancestral halls, and clan associations. Thus, civic
organizations left in this transformation were mainly subordinate to the massive Party
state. The re-existence of relatively independent social organizations should be traced
back to the time after the many economic reforms started in 1979. Yu pointed out the
transformation of ownership forms and the improvement of productivity and living
standards 243 were major factors contributing to this phenomenon. However, their
independence was still limited and they were essentially controlled by the Party state.
Subsequently, one might conclude that there were just a few organizations in China that
could satisfy the ‗autonomy‘ requirements of the traditional notion of civil society244.
Essentially, the public perceive NGOs as being similar to the notion of ‗popular
organizations‘ (minjian zuzhi)245. In the past, all organizations that are self-governed and
non-profit, in essence, would be classified as social organizations, non-governmental &
non-commercial enterprises (also known as Civil/ Private Non-Profit Enterprises;
hereafter abbreviated as ‗NGNCEs‘ or ‗non-profit enterprises) and foundations. Hence,
the Chinese official classification of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is
242
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different from the Western one. Chinese officials and scholars generally named selfgoverned organizations which lobby for diverse interests as non-profit organizations
(NPOs) rather than NGOs, in order to eliminate the implication of anti-government
sentiment reflected in the Chinese language 246 . Yang further classified environmental
organizations which are able to place the official definition of social organizations into
seven categories in accordance with their registration status (as shown in Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 – Types of Social Organizations (in environmental realm) in China
Organizational Type

Registration Status

Examples

Registered NGOs

Legally registered as
organizations or private,
non-profit work units

Friends of Nature; Green
River

Non-profit Enterprises

Registered as business
enterprises but operate as
non-profit organizations

Global Village of Beijing;
Institute of Environment
and Development;

Unregistered Voluntary
Groups

Unregistered organizations
that function as NGOs

Green Earth Volunteers

Web-based groups

Unregistered groups that
operate mainly through the
Internet

Green-Web; Greener
Beijing

Student environmental
associations

Registered with campus
Youth Leagues yet function
and perceived as NGOs

Environmental Volunteer
Association

University Research
Centres / Institutes

Affiliated with institutions
of higher learning but
operate as NGOs

Centre for Legal Assistance
to Pollution Victims, China
University of Political
Science and Law

Government-organized
NGOs

Social organizations
established by government
agencies, also known as
state-owned NGOs

China Environmental
Science Association

Source: Captured from Table 1, Yang Guobin, ‗Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in
China‘, The China Quarterly, no. 181 (Mar. 2005), 50.
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In order to avoid misunderstanding, in addition to the inclusion of grass roots
organizations which have not registered with the authorities but have contributed a lot of
efforts in social and economic development, this thesis will name all entities that are
self-governed (or government-controlled civil organizations in different realms) as social
organizations (SOs). If specific types of organizations were to be highlighted, it will be
mentioned in detail according to Yang‘s classification.
In retrospect, the party-state had never recognized the importance of SOs
‗development until the Jiang-Zhu administration in 1998. In the 15th Party Congress,
Zhu Rongji – the former Prime Minister – expressed the necessity to encourage the
development of ‗social intermediary organizations‘ as a component of deepening
economic reforms 247 . Initially, the stress of the central leaders tended to reduce the
responsibilities of tackling the negative impacts of a series of reforms in 1998, such as
the downsizing of bureaucracy, state enterprise reforms and restructuring the State
Council 248 . Thus, they emphasized the responsibilities of SOs being intermediary
between the party-state and ordinary people. In Graph 5.2, the official data of social
organizations and non-profit enterprises, after the Jiang-Zhu era, is as shown.
Graph 5.2 – Number of Social Organizations and Civil Non-Profit Units in China
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Source: Civil Affairs Bureau, Civil Affairs Development Statistical Reports in 2003-2008, [Online Chinese
File] available from http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/ , Retrieved on 5 Apr., 2010.

From Graph 5.2, it is clear that the number of registered social organizations has grown
since 2000. It seems to testimony the direct correlation between leaders‘ encouragement
and the growth of social organizations. Nevertheless, the graph also indicated another
noteworthy trend in the development of civil society organizations: that is the rapid
growth of civil non-profit enterprises. In 1999, the Falun Gong awakened the sense of
threat for central leaders as it surprisingly gathered approximately 10,000 followers to
surround the Zhongnanhai, the headquarters of the central leadership, for more than
thirteen hours. This incident reflected the dilemma that the CCP was facing in the issue
of the emergence of social organizations. On the one hand, it recognized the necessity
for SOs in society from their intermediate nature between the state and society249, and
from their absorption of excessive manpower posed by downsizing the bureaucracy 250;
on the other hand, it experienced the contest for legitimacy that SOs could bring in
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Tiananmen Massacre and Falun Gong Crackdown251. As a consequence, the party state
strengthened its manipulation of civil society through a range of administrative and legal
means, such as seeking for professional units in the bureaucracy252, nominating from a
sponsoring unit for registration, and the inability of appealing against the failure of
registration. These policies are aimed at restraining the growth of civil society
organizations under the manipulation of the party in order to move the party away from
another tremendous confrontation such as with the Falun Gong253; hence civil society
was portrayed as ‗state-led‘ or ‗state-sponsored‘

254

. This political scenario

fundamentally influences mutual interactions between the Party and NGOs, as well as
the development of Chinese NGOs. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate some
characteristics of SOs before examining their roles in individual hydropower projects.

Characteristics of Chinese ENGOs
Notwithstanding economic liberalization, the CCP seems to be struggling to
foster the social openness that allows civil society to have greater autonomy, and is
reflected by the party‘s administrative restraints and violent repressions. He Baogang
suggested separating the notions of an opening ‗economic civil society‘ and the closure
of ‗political civil society‘, in which autonomy of civic society organizations is highly
related to how high-level officials perceive their political interests; and the essence of
these organizations relied heavily on their compromises with the party state255. Hence,
the development of civil society is still highly influenced by the authorities. In chapter 2,
the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 was highlighted to analyze its impacts for the central
251
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leadership. This tragedy, additionally, becomes the nightmare of activists and social
organizations in China. However, the top-down repressions afterward from the party
seriously hampered the development of civil society. Activists and social organizations
learned a lesson from this incident and attempted to steer away from political challenge
with the party. As a result, a paradoxical phenomenon was formed in the state-society
relationship. He observed this phenomenon through green NGOs;
‗the Chinese embedded context forces green organizations
and activities into the role of a partner of the state, rather
than a representative and defender of certain interests. As
a result, environmental activists take all necessary means
to avoid being regarded as, or even having the potential
for, growing into a full-fledged, green social movement256‘.
In other words, due to their fear of the authoritarian CCP, Chinese NGOs tended to
remain in a fragmented, low-scaled, localized and informally institutionalized stage.
However, they seemed to encounter drawbacks from remaining in such an immature
stage of development, such as a lack of financial and personnel resources, public
unfamiliarity and limited possibility of being involved in policy making. Hence, they
tended to take part in some ‗specialized and media-attractive, yet politically innocent
activities 257 ‘. This intention was arguably to eliminate the functions of NGOs, as it
hampered organizations‘ capabilities in lobbying for their own interests, or even
challenging the authorities to fight for their own interests258. However, this argument
seems to be deficient since it was not able to explain the resultant suspension of the Nu
River Project by ENGOs, and so neglected the pressure constructed through societymedia cooperation. Yang contributed to correlate Ho‘s observation on the fact of
successful mobilization for the suspension of dam construction in the Nu River Project.
256
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He pointed out that Chinese ENGOs were successful in identifying the cleavages of
bureaucracies and could negotiate with the authorities through kaleidoscopic tactics,
such as informal coalitions and contact with environmental departments, as well as
direct petition letter to the leadership. Subsequently, they were able to pressure the
central leadership despite being closely constrained. This argument would be further
elaborated after demonstrating the functions and actions of ENGOs in both specific
projects.
Apart from their high awareness and intertwined relationship with the authorities,
the Chinese NGOs also characterized a heavy reliance on charismatic leaders and
individuals in the organizations. For example, the Friends of Nature – one of the most
well-known NGOs in China – depends on the personal network and political prestige of
Liang Congjie, one of founders of the organization259 . These leaders generally either
have experience of being cadres and journalists, who are more likely to have a wellestablished informal personal relationship (guanxi) in the bureaucracy and with mass
media, or ‗(were) strong in professional expertise and international connections 260‘. In
her research, Lu discovered that those leaders who generally had good presentation and
relations skills, in addition to high fund-raising capabilities261, appeared frequently in a
range of reports, seminars and salons. All of these abilities meant they were able to
facilitate, and even to determine, the exposure and familiarity of organizations.
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Therefore, this would fundamentally influence the effectiveness of lobbying and
participating in policy making.
In short, discussing the transformation of civil society is a critical part of
understanding the policy making processes in China, particularly in the post-reform
period. Despite the common communist contexts, the Chinese ENGOs were unlikely to
have the similar influence of their Eastern European counterparts in successfully
encouraging democratization in their countries. On the contrary, they remained
influential due to the party‘s tolerance but are reluctant to have antagonistic relationship
with the authorities. This may, however, be the consequences of autocratic, cruel and
bloody repressions at Tiananmen Square and of Falun Gong in 1989 and 1999
respectively. Additionally, a range of administrative instruments existed to obstruct
social organizations in having legal recognition and development. Thus, Chinese NGOs
are more likely to be ‗sensitive‘ to the political context of the party state and in
particular of the central leadership, to prevent it from touching the boundary of the
central leadership. Undoubtedly, these limitations hinder Chinese NGOs from having
check-and-balance

responsibilities

which

their

western

counterparts

possess.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that the Chinese NGOs or activists are unable to pressure
the authorities and fight for their interests. The facts from TGP and NRP indicate that
they, on the contrary, could generate huge pressure on the authorities through
cooperating with the mass media and international allies.

TGP – Clapping with a Single Hand?
In considering the political influences, some features of civil society of China in
the late 1980s and early 1990s should be introduced, as these features can provide
contextual influences for engagement of society in policy formulation. Generally, the
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significance of social organizations and individual activists in TGP seemed to be
dimmer than provincial leaders. Thus, when the proposal of the Three Gorges Project
was publicized, it was argued that the major obstacle of this project was negotiation
within the bureaucracy, rather than pressure from civil society 262 . As mentioned
previously, civil society in China was seriously hampered in the June-Fourth Massacre.
In this massacre, students, intellectuals, and workers demonstrated the potential leverage
of civil society against the authorities and, hence, the party state revised its attitude for
the development of the civil society. Institutionalization of social organizations had
become one of the major concerns of the party. Within the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(MOCA), a division office took care of the institutionalization, development and
management of social organizations. Apart from more institutionalized and stricter
supervision for the civil society, the party state also strengthened the regulatory system
so that more social organizations were abolished263. Subsequently, the contributions of
social organizations and individual activists were limited. In addition, the central
leadership had launched a campaign of ‗directing the public opinion‘ in which anti-dam
opinions were prohibited in the mass media, resulting in it being more difficult for
individual activists to amplify their heterogeneous opinions. The limitations of
environmental activists and agencies did not only exist in their attempts to reach the
media and the public, but also in their efforts to establish coalitions with international
society.
According to Khagram, a number of foreign and international environmental
organizations, such as Probe International, River Watch East and Southeast Asia and
International River Network, expressed strong opposition to the implementation of TGP
and persuaded other governments from engaging in this project. Foreign opponents
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suggested a range of arguments against diverse aspects of the project such as
environmental damage, cultural heritage, and navigational obstructions; it then published
anti-dam writings of Chinese journalists and scholars, such as Dai‘s Yangtze! Yangtze!
and Wu Ming‘s field report264, so as to mobilize domestic intellectuals and celebrities to
alter the Chinese government‘s determination. The close existence of anti-dam
movements abroad and hunger strike of students in Beijing caused Chinese leaders to
think about linking these two independent activities and tackled these problems ‗with the
full range of repressive tactics available under their authoritarian regime‘ 265 . The
oppressive and autocratic attitude of the central leadership obstructed Chinese
environmental intellectuals and organizations from taking part in the feasibility
assessment of the project. Consequently, despite their forecasts of the destructive
environmental damage, Chinese activists and organizations did not express their full
opposition against the project.
Not only were opinions of anti-dam activists and organizations suppressed in the
policy making process due to the ‗guiding public opinion‘ campaign before the approval
of the NPC for the project, opinions of some NGOs and intellectuals who have close
links with the party state were also filtered by the authorities. However, they were
allowed to express opinions for the project, such as conducting researches to provide
recommendations for various aspects of the project 266. However, they were not be able
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to challenge the feasibility of the project and could only provide supportive testimonies
and evidences which were favorable for the project 267.
In the early 1990s, social organizations were not given sufficient legal and
political sphere to develop, so only a few institutionalized organizations existed to
participate in the decision making process; and research centres in universities were
considered the exception. Under the blessings of universities, these research centres
benefited from a certain degree of resources and personal supports for conducting
researches on the Three Gorges Project. Policy recommendations in researches from
some renowned universities, such as Tsing Hua University and the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS), were even considered when policies were discussed 268 .
Nevertheless, their researches could not challenge the feasibility of the project.
Consequently, the participation of intellectuals and experts from different disciplines, to
some extent, were constrained.
In short, voluntary organizations and individual activists outside the bureaucracy
would rarely participate and lobby for any feasibility assessment of the project. This was
essentially due to the strong repressions of the party leadership since the Tiananmen
Massacre and the ‗guiding public opinion‘ campaign before the approval of the project
by NPC. Domestic anti-dam intellectuals and activists had limited links with the media
needed to amplify their arguments to the public. Just a few -- such as Dai Qing, Wu
Ming and Jun Jing -- could approach foreign publishers and other anti-project activists
abroad to lobby their interests or to express their viewpoints about the project. Other
intellectuals and scholars, both for and against the project, could conduct their
researches and make recommendations in limited ways. Yet, they were unlikely to
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challenge official feasibility assessment and determination of the project. Currently,
even as the dam is approaching completion, researchers are not allowed to enter
reservoir areas in Chongqing Municipality to conduct any research. Strict repressions by
the authorities made the project ‗taboo‘ in China and impeded individual activists‘
efforts to contribute to the project beyond what has been done by the authorities. The
TGP reflects the political and social reality in policy formulation of mega projects and
infrastructure construction which are determined by the party state autocratically and
where civil society was not sufficiently engaged. Yet there has been a huge change with
the NRP, in which social organizations, or more accurately, environmental social
organizations seemed to have some ability to suspend implementation of gigantic
hydropower projects and even involve in the decision making of the project.

NRP—Evidence of the Rise of SO?
After more than a decade of the TGP, another mega hydropower project reflected
how emergent civic society hopes to pressure the authoritarian government.
Environmental voluntary agents, such as Green Watershed (GW) and Friends of Nature
(FN), seemed to contribute significantly to altering the initial determination of the
central authorities in encouraging hydroelectricity development. In particular, in the Nu
River Project, 13 dams were proposed to be constructed along the Nu River in Yunnan
Province and Chinese ENGOs were praised as they succeeded in effectively obstructing
the project. In the 1980s, the contribution of ENGOs and other civil social organizations
were strongly suppressed by the mighty party state, particularly after the Tiananmen
Square Massacre. Nevertheless, they could amplify their opposition against the project
through cooperating with other players, such as the media, international organizations
and environmental agencies within the bureaucratic systems. The extreme differences in
the consequences of the NRP and the TGP might thus indicate the transformation of
118

roles of civil society in policy formulations and hydroelectricity development in China.
This section, therefore, will sketch out the process of ENGOs for contesting the NRP
and examining their roles in the project.
The participation of emergent ENGOs in the conservation of Nu River should be
referred back to controversies involved in the construction of Manwan Dam over the
Lancang River, in the mid-1990s. Although it is not a direct component of the gigantic
Nu River Project, it should be recognized as a starting point of the state-society contest
about hydroelectric development projects in South-West China. In the midst of these
controversies, the Yunnan provincial government came into direct confrontation with
one of the most influential grass-root ENGOs in Yunnan – GW. The Yunnan provincial
government once investigated GW on suspicion of it engaging in illegal issues,
dispatching a representative team from the local bureaucrats and scholars from Yunnan
Academy of Social Sciences (YASS) with requests for the organization to disband.
When the representative team visited the Nujiang region for investigation, they
encountered petition from ordinary people testifying to the innocence of the GW 269 .
Besides, the tense relationship of GW with the Yunnan provincial government since the
Manwan Dam controversy has uncovered cleavages within the vast bureaucratic system.
This is significant, for when the Yunnan provincial government ordered GW to disband,
SEPA – one of environmental administrative organs in the centre – showed its favorable
stance to the GW and claimed that the GW was innocent, while also criticizing the
Yunnan provincial government as not having sufficient testimonies for their order
against GW270.
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In retrospect, the successful recognition of the proposed NRP site as a ‗natural‘
World Heritage Site, and the effectiveness of the new Environmental Impact Assessment
Law (hereafter abbreviated as ‗Environmental Law‘) in 2003271 were symbolic turning
points of the state-society confrontation in the NRP. Before 2003, ENGOs, particularly
grassroots organizations that did not have close relationship with the authorities, had
limited channels to lobby their interests and arguments, and these interests included
educating the affected people and having interviewing shown on a national television
station. These two incidents in 2003 could effectively consolidate their arguments
against the project and draw the attention of the public to this area. It might also
facilitate ENGOs to mobilize their international allies and media, and amplify their
opposition to the project. For example, twenty journalists, scholars and environmental
protection volunteers from Beijing were invited and organized for a nine-day trip to the
Nu River by GW and Global Volunteers (GV) in February 2004. In the midst of the trip,
participants collected stories from residents and recorded videos to reflect the status quo.
It was regarded as an important step for local grassroots ENGOs to make the anti-dam
campaign one that was worthy of nationwide attention272.
Different from their successors after the Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese ENGOs
had been more aggressive in expressing their discontent towards the project. Apart from
mobilizing the mass media and their counterparts in other regions, they had even
petitioned the central leadership directly by collecting signatures of scholars, journalists,
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students and celebrities in the society and then sending the petition letter and collected
signatures to leaders in Zhongnanhai. This was particularly useful for ENGOs under the
control of the leadership who either had a close relationship with bureaucrats or
participated in the NPC or Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
This method could be properly illustrated by the petitioning action of Green Earth
Volunteers (GEV) – one of important but unregistered ENGOs in China – in December
2003. Wang Yongchen was the famous leader of GEV and had a close relationship with
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) – one of important environmental
protection apparatus of the Chinese government. She encouraged approximately sixty
renowned and influential scholars, journalists and celebrities to sign the petition letter in
order to request an intervention by the central government, so that the Nu River was
protected from gigantic dam construction 273 . Besides, more than 10,000 students in
Chongqing Municipality signed a petition letter to express their common opposition
against Nu River Project in 2005.
In a nutshell, Chinese ENGOs differed from their western counterparts because
of their restrained autonomy and lack of independence from the authorities. Nevertheless,
the success of obstructing the NRP from implementation has attracted worldwide
attention to the development of Chinese ENGOs. It is believed that the influence of
Chinese ENGOs in policy formulation could no longer be underestimated or neglected.
In the anti-dam campaign, these ENGOs had utilized a wide range of channels –
domestic, national and even international -- to amplify their arguments in order to
construct a sufficient pressure area and demand that central authorities intervene in the
policy making process of the NRP. Different organizations utilized channels and tactics
that were more likely to be successful in drawing the public‘s attention or gaining a
273
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respectable advantage, such as developing close relationships with the authorities, media
or affected people. In addition, they had closer alliances and more frequent interactions
or co-operative efforts with their international counterparts, such as the World Wildlife
Fund, and the International River Network. However, do these actions mean that the
tremendous transformation of SOs could enable them to have a more dominant role in
developing mega projects? In the following section, the transformation of civil society in
China will be discussed and society‘s roles in both projects will be compared. Hence, it
is argued that social organizations have been more significant in the decision making
process, but they are still encountering a variety of limitations and need to deal with
these limitations with the aid of other fields in society.

Civil Society in Decision Making Process
Dilemma of Social Organizations: Autonomy vs. Influential power
Despite the recent emergence of SOs, civil society remained in a subordinate
relationship with the Party after the establishment of PRC; therefore, Chinese civil
society was suspected of not being eligible to fit into the conventional definition of a
‗civil society. With the TGP, the skepticism against Chinese civic society organizations
seemed to be valid, since the formation and opinions of civic voluntary organizations
were mainly repressed or ‗guided‘ by the authorities. Although there were a few
individual activists breaking through the closed oppression of the authorities and
connecting with international civic organizations, the majority of civic voluntary
organizations were still being scared by the nightmare of Tiananmen Massacre in 1989.
Owing to previous lessons of cruel and bloody oppressions of the authorities since 1949,
Chinese civic organizations were struggling in the predicament of autonomy and
survival in a narrow political sphere. Thus, in order to gain a larger public sphere, SOs
sought an amiable relationship with the authorities – both central and local – and
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managed to become generally supplementary to the policy implementation of state274. In
the eyes of the SOs‘ leaders, having an amiable and meshed relationship with the
government and the Party, yet compromising on a certain degree of autonomy and
independence, was the most effective way of gaining influence 275. White suggested that
the authorities recognized the necessity of social organizations in dealing with new
challenges of economic and social changes that are associated with economic
liberalization, but believed that the political and social threats, posed by uncontrolled,
un-disciplined and disarrayed SOs should be managed and disciplined. Thus, the party
state would maintain close supervision in the development of civil social organizations.
Saich further explained this logic in the party-state perspective:
‗…the state has tried to influence key groups in society by
binding them into organizations that become dependent on
its patronage. To head off potential mass opposition, the
state will attempt to extend its organization, co-ordination
and supervision of as much of the population as
possible……This move by the state from insulation from
society to integration within it can be interpreted as an
attempt to prevent a plurality of definitions arising by
revising the structure of the regime and the state‘s
relationship with the society276‘.
From Saich‘s analysis, the Party state had transformed its participatory pattern from
‗insulation‘ to ‗integration‘ and it seemed that Chinese SOs might have greater
autonomy than before. This may probably be the consequence of the diversification of
funding sources. In the past, the largest share of SOs funding was from the Party state
and this was particularly true for GONGOs. In Table 5.3, the funding structure of SOs is
shown.
Table 5.3—Funding Structure of Social Organizations in China277
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Type of funding
Government Subsidies and Grants
Membership Fees
Income through Commercial Activities
Project Funding or Grants by Companies
Others
Project Funding by the Government
Collection Funding
Donations by Individuals (Excluding Membership
fee)
Surplus Funding from the Previous Year
Project Funding or Grants by International
Organizations
Capital Turnover

Percentage
50
21.2
6
5.6
4
3.6
2.2
2
1.8
1.6
1.2

Project Funding or Grants by Domestic Foundations

0.5

Loans (Commercial & Non-Commercial)

0.3

Source: Table 2.3, Ho, 2008:32

By compromising on autonomy, these GONGOs were supported with stable and
considerable fundings from the state. On the contrary, for those organizations which
have a weaker linkage with the authorities, a significant proportion of fundings was
made available from abroad278. For example, the Centre of Biodiversity and Indigenous
Knowledge (CBIK), which is based in Kunming, Yunnan, intensified its foreign funding
income from U.S. $203,000 in 2002 to nearly U.S.$ 550,000 in 2004 279. Nevertheless,
the situation more or less changed in the anti-dam campaign. More Chinese ENGOs
could access funding from their foreign counterparts, such as International River
Netwok, and Oxfam in Hong Kong 280. Besides, more organizations have become selfsufficient. It might probably be the consequence of a contraction in government funding
towards domestic social organizations associated with downsizing reform of the
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government. Ma pointed out that it widened the interest gap between SOs and the Party,
and would further motivate SOs to approach foreign sources or sources beyond the
public sector. Accordingly, the motivation and orientation of SOs to be autonomous
from government‘s intervention would be accelerated281.
In short, Chinese SOs tended to have an intimate relationship with the
government, even though it might sacrifice a certain degree of autonomy and
independence. The apparent advantage of this action meant that not only did
organizations have more resources and fundings to develop, it also enabled them to have
greater leverages for lobbying their interests. Unfortunately, the gradual retreat of
government from intervening in the civil society and curtailing the government‘s
funding towards organizations have widened the interest gap between the government
and SOs. Subsequently, the state-society relationship might incur more confrontation
than before, with the anti-dam campaign in the NRP being a typical illustration for this
phenomenon.
International Alliance and Media Activisms
On the other hand, while ENGOs were successful in urging the government to
suspend the Nu River Project from construction, the influence of the media and
international non-governmental organizations should not be neglected. In this section, I
will argue that the media and international organizations seem to have become an
effective catalyst in reinforcing the pressure from Chinese SOs against the government,
in particular the media. In retrospect, Chinese SOs had limited contacts with their
international counterparts. This may have been due to the authoritarian insulation by the
Party into the civil society. Additionally, from the TGP, the autocratic repression of
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opposition in the civil society by the CCP hampered transnational coalitions of SOs.
Khagram further analyzed that
‗China‘s authoritarian regime prevented domestic antidam proponents from effectively accessing domestic
decision-making structures as well as from forging
sustained coalitions with trans-nationally allied
nongovernmental advocacy organizations. Perhaps most
important, however, the lack of domestic social
mobilization limited the ability of opponents to more
dramatically alter the trajectory of the Three Gorges
Dam282.‘
Accordingly, a number of scholars and activists tried to access the foreign anti-dam
network and provide information of the Three Gorges Dam.
Since the mid-1990s, the intermediary position of civil society between the party
state and ordinary people has provided opportunities for SOs to develop their links and
cooperation with other Party organs, in particular the mass media. Due to the
paradoxical confrontation between the politically ascendant Party and market power
since 1980s, the mass media tended to expand their professional values and autonomy.
As a consequence, these organizations seemed to ‗share structurally similar positions
with the mass media283‘. This reciprocal relationship between society and the media has
tightened their coalition but it tended to be informal. The NRP was thereby viewed as
the most effective example of reflecting the society-media coalition. In their article,
Yang and Calhoun explained that mass media could facilitate the excavation of a broad
public sphere, which refers to ‗the space for public discourse and communications‘ so as
to provide fertile land for the growth of public opinion about the environment 284. They
observed that ENGOs in the anti-NRP campaign acted in a pivotal role and the media
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could reinforce the controversy of the issue in an effort to stir up more diverse public
opinion285. For instance, Wang Yongchen allied with Zhang Kejia, who is a senior and
well-known journalist in China, to have numerous news reports published about the antiNRP debate in China Youth Daily 286 . Additionally, there was a related exhibition in
Beijing in which a number of celebrities, journalists and scholars were invited to
participate287. All these actions of cooperation both social organizations and the media
have seemingly mounted a greater debate about the project beyond local society.
On the other hand, the coalitions between Chinese social organizations with
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were also another important
catalyst for putting pressure on the centre. Apart from amplifying the opposition voices,
the close coalitions of domestic and international NGOs might have positive
contribution for encouraging institutional reforms, or even democratization, of the
country 288 . Since 1995, interactions between domestic and international NGOs and
agencies have been closer. For instance, the World Bank and INGOs directly subsidized
domestic NGOs to further develop – both technically and financially. Some Chinese
NGOs introduced the ways of operation from their international or foreign counterparts
in an effort to improve their administrative efficiency 289 . Through contrasting the
situations of TGP and NRP, the effectiveness of international-domestic organizations‘
coalitions to pressure the centre seems to be further verified. In the TGP, the domesticinternational nexus was limited. Not only social organizations, but the connections of
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individual activists were also retrained. Only a few of scholars could establish networks
with foreign counterparts. Dai Qing, the most well-known opponent against the Three
Gorges Project, communicated with a variety of international organizations, such as
Probe international, to mount the opposition campaign of the large dam construction.
Yet, due to their limited relationship with domestic social organizations, the INGOs
showed their opposition to, and petition against, the Three Gorges Project. They even
lobbied the different state institutions to draw them away from financing the project, and
criticized to the feasibility report conducted by the Chinese government. Apparently, the
influence of this criticism seemed to be limited. The Chinese government simply chose
to finance the project without foreign financial aid in order to go around INGOs‘
obstruction. By contrast, the actions of INGOs in the anti-NRP campaign were more
effective by cooperating with domestic NGOs. Since the late 1990s, more INGOs have
established their offices in China, such as Greenpeace, Oxfam and Friends of Earth
(Hong Kong), and their correlations with domestic NGOs had been closer 290 . Thus,
Yang pointed out the ‗symbiotic‘ relationship between domestic and international NGOs.
While INGOS could establish domestic partnerships to implement their global agendas,
local NGOs could access more funding, information and resources beyond the Party
state in order to possess more independence 291. With the NRP, the coalition of INGOs
and domestic NGOs has tightened. Prior to the announcement of suspending the NRP,
sixty international NGOs gathered and signed a petition letter against the NRP, which
was sent directly to the Chinese government, and they also called on UNESCO to
intervene292.
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Undoubtedly, the ENGOs and SOs in other related aspects were pivotal to the
Chinese anti-dam campaign. However, from contrasting the cases in TGP and the NRP,
it is not difficult to see that the obstruction of domestic civil society is not as strong as
anticipation. The inclusion of mass media and international NGOs probably reinforced
the bargaining power of social organizations. In the TGP, the Party leadership launched
a campaign of ‗guiding public opinion‘ across the whole country in an authoritarian
manner. Thus, the stances of the media were generally favorable towards the project. In
addition, local organizations and activists were constrained by their ties to international
networks. The sole opposition by international NGOs did not sufficiently alter the
central decision of constructing the gigantic dam. On the contrary, the coalition of
domestic ENGOs-mass media-INGOs stressed the contradictory actions of the Yunnan
provincial government and state-owned power enterprise to develop the series of 13 Nu
River dam construction projects. Moreover, they have amplified the anti-dam campaign
so as to draw nationwide attention, and have thus more likely provoked the central
leadership to intervene and alter the decision.
Even with the success in halting the NRP, the development of civil society in
China does not look optimistic and no one should assume Chinese social organizations
have the ability to challenge the Party state. In the past, Chinese NGOs have tended to
value an intimate relationship with the authorities, even though they might have to
compromise a certain degree of independence and autonomy. For leaders of these NGOs,
they preferred to insert themselves into the policy-making processes, rather than to
directly confront the Party. The vague attitude of social organizations might largely be
due to the autocratic and violent history of top-down state repression. Additionally, the
essence of Chinese NGOs is generally informal, un-institutionalized and immature.
Consequently, they would have encountered more constraints and limitations in the
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development and sustainability of organizations, if they had been more independent
from the government. Nonetheless, the administrative reforms of the government in
1998 contributed to civil society and these have led to further development, since more
excessive manpower has been absorbed by social organizations and the government has
gradually curtailed its subsidies towards social organizations. In the new millennium, the
society-government confrontation seemed to be fiercer. For instance, in the NRP, the
ENGOs allied with INGOs and the mass media to lobby using arguments against the
dam construction effort.
Through these strategic actions with other entities in society, Chinese social
organizations have wanted to encourage leadership and the public to broaden their
considerations beyond economic development 293. Distinct from their Eastern European
counterparts, Chinese NGOs are more unlikely to challenge the legitimacy of the Party.
However, they would intensify the fragmentation of interests in the society and
diversification the agenda within the Party leadership. Thus, one might conclude that
they could satisfy their sociological functions to import more issues and departmental
interests for debate with the government 294, but they are more likely to be weak and
reluctant in fostering the democratization of the country and directly challenging the
Party. However, even the sociological intentions might actually influence the policy
formulation process of China and modify the FA model in the theoretical sense.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion
After much progress, a series of questions have been addressed through a review
of reciprocal interactions and transformation of leverages in three important players, i.e.
central government, provincial governments and officials, and the civil society in the
decision making processes of the Three Gorges and the Nu River projects. (1) However,
why should these three players be recognized as critical in decision making process?
Thus, beyond these three, are there any players which are secondary but critical in the
different processes? (2) How did these players perceive and exercise their own roles and
interests in the processes? (3) How did the political and economic contexts of these two
projects determine and transform individuals‘ perceptions? As the final part of the thesis,
this chapter intends to summarize the findings of previous chapters and further explain
the findings to the applicability of the FA model. Also, explanation will be given to how
the findings contribute to further studying the prospects of China and global
hydroelectricity development, as well as institutional development.
The thesis begins with an overview of hydroelectricity development in China,
which originated from the necessity of river management for human and scientific
revolutions in the modern world; and China has possessed a longest history of river
management. Successful river management is represented in the legitimacy and
sustainability of the regime and the changes that Chinese river management has gone
through. Thus, I argue that dam construction is essentially full of political significance,
and that, in the contemporary China, dam construction functions as more than mere
counter-flooding. Famous leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong and Deng
Xiaoping, hoped to reinforce the modernization of the Chinese economy through dam
construction. In addition to the practical shortfall of energy consumption since economic
reforms, hydroelectricity has become one of the most important and grand strategies for
economic and social development in the eyes of the elite. The TGP and NRP reflected
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two stages of hydroelectricity development in China and in contemporary China
respectively. Thus, in the following section, the transformation of bargaining amongst
actors will be summarized.

Dimensional Bargaining of Players
Summarizing the transformation of complicated bargaining amongst actors
should be classified as reciprocal interactions, bargaining knots and strategies. In chapter
1, the bargaining ‗knots‘ were stated to represent the consideration and contentions of
actors in the decision making processes of the individual projects.
Reciprocal Interactions
Referring to Graph 6.1 (sees p.140), the interactions of actors are more
independent from others; in other words, there were few collective actions and little
cooperation between actors. However, this may have been due to the autocracy of the
central leadership during that period. Thus, later in the June-Fourth Massacre in 1989,
the decision making process of the TGP was more leadership-oriented. In this project,
the party leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, became the dynamic force for
the successful implementation of the project. Under this backdrop, the debate of this
project was fierce but limited. Researchers and central and local officials were reluctant
and lacked the sphere to challenge decisions over the feasibility of projects presented by
the leadership. As a result, other actors seemed to become feeble compared to the
mighty party leadership, and in particular, mass media and civil society. Prior to the
official approval of the project in the NPC, the central government launched a ‗guiding
public opinion‘ campaign to suppress anti-project opinions and requested that mass
media comment positively on the project. Accordingly, there was only a small sphere for
domestic social organizations and individual activists who developed and amplified their
oppositional opinions towards the project. Hence, the project was rarely challenged even
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though it had aroused worldwide attention and extensive criticism. On the other hand,
local cadres, particularly cadres from reservoir areas, predicted that the project would be
associated with an enormous amount of capital injection into the local economies from
the centre. This considerable capital and other related policies were viewed as
instruments for fostering the economic development of these provinces. Thus, they were
generally favorable towards decisions from the centre, even though there were scattered
debates on the details of particular issues, such as the height of a dam and the
management of resettlements, and so on.
In contrast, triangular interactions in the NRP (see Graph 6.2, p.141) were
relatively responsive and confrontational. Decentralization evolved, since economic
reforms had eliminated the participation of central governments in the practical
formulation of local economic issues, and provincial governments were granted the right
to intensify autonomy of policy formulation. Therefore, the central-periphery
relationship and responsibilities had transformed, even though the subordinating
relationship generally remained unchanged. Apart from the provincial governments, the
emergence of civil society and the rationalization of the mass media, since the late 1990s,
enabled social organizations to have a greater political sphere of development.
Subsequently, their participation in the NRP became more aggressive and hostile. They
were able to criticize the NRP directly and amplify their contentions through various
channels, particularly via cooperation with their international counterparts and the
domestic media, such as CCTV, the internet and the press. Through these channels, they
were able to arouse national awareness and even direct petition to the central leadership,
which could effectively reinforce anti-project pressure towards central government. This
is why Wen Jiabao, the Prime Minister of the State Council, would publicly announce
the suspension of the NRP. Apparently, although still powerful, the central leadership
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has been more responsive to the issue. In chapters 3 and 5, the project was mentioned as
being approved by the National Development and Reform Commission in the State
Council, at its initial stage. Nevertheless, civil society, in collaboration with mass media
and international NGOs, were able to reinforce public opinion against the project, which
enabled the central government to reshape and intervene, and thus suspend the process.
Bargaining Knots
Bargaining knots in the interactive triangles of two projects represented the
differentiation of focus points and rationales behind their interactions towards others.
Thus, due to the strong legacies of the Tiananmen Square Massacre during the decision
making process, the bargaining knots of actors in the TGP reflected that the project was
viewed as a means to bailout of legitimacy crisis in the party. For the central leadership,
however, the cruel suppression of the student movement in the massacre damaged the
legitimacy of the party, and it was necessary for the party leadership to have an
instrument for consolidating the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Moreover, the
shared background of technocracy and the considerable personal interests of leaders in
the project favored an autocratic attitude of the leadership towards it. Beyond the central
leadership, individuals in civil society were also influenced by the legacies of the
Tiananmen Square Massacre. They tended to be in awe of the leadership which
prevented them from confronting against the party directly. Besides this, the massacre
bated their contacts with a number of international counterparts, owing to close
supervision and manipulation from the authorities after the massacre. Subsequently,
their stance was generally favorable towards the project and the debate concentrated on
the details of it.
Meanwhile, provincial leaders, because of the absence of a middle class in the
society and their intermediary nature between ordinary people and central government,
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had the responsibility of representing local interests which requested the maintaining or
pursuance of high pace economic growth. A series of administrative reforms at the
provincial level, such as fiscal decentralization, rationalization of agencies and
empowerment of local governments, brought about the pursuit of high economic growth
rates as means to influence the probability of promotion 295 . Accordingly, provincial
leaders were motivated to adopt a strong pro-growth stance and economic development
of the provinces, and there exists a phenomenon known as ‗local developmentalism‘.
Provincial leaders would be aggressive in order to retain a high growth rate of revenue
and develop various industries in higher preference, similar to an entrepreneur 296 .
Alternatively, they would also compete for resources, capital and manpower in order to
facilitate both industrial and economic development. Owing to the considerable capital
and manpower associated with gigantic projects, they would view these projects, such as
TGP and NRP, as an opportunity to accelerate the economic growth of individual
provinces; and this would thereby produce better career and political prospects. As a
result, provincial leaders generally prefer dam construction. Thus, the bargaining tool of
provincial leaders seemed not only to retain but also to reinforce their pro-growth
perceptions.
Moreover, although there was rapid economic liberalization, the ‗open door‘
policy widened the income disparity between rural and urban areas, as well as coastal
and interior regions. When Yunnan province proposed to construct the Nu River Project,
provincial leaders wanted to improve the accessibility of the most remote region of
South Western China and to accelerate revenue through selling hydroelectricity. Thus,
the utilitarian rationales of the provincial cadres for supporting the NRP were the
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illustrations of their developmentalist doctrine. There is no doubt that the dynamic of
promoting NRP was no longer with the central government, but the Yunnan provincial
government. The indifference of the central government was a consequence of further
decentralization in the 1980s. Currently, the central government will no longer directly
participate in policy formulation of economic development, but can provide grand
instructions to agencies in the lower level of the hierarchy and would keep its power of
approval for policies. Consequently, the role of coordination for central government
seems to be fostered, while its authority has been restrained due to decentralization.
Unfortunately, the cleavages amongst bureaucratic agencies at the central level might be
wide and apparent. However, penetration of market mechanisms into the bureaucratic
system has moved the hierarchy to be more modernized and segmented. Thus, the
bureaucratic apparatus has become the route to pursue departmental goals and interests,
and this phenomenon deepened cleavages amongst organs. While the central leadership
becomes the referee and coordinator who impartially consider interests of the various
organs, they require more time to achieve a consensus and prevent decision from being
made too quickly. The self-restraint of the central leadership297 also contributed to the
greater political sphere for social organizations and the mass media. Furthermore,
organizations and mass media will also encounter keen competition owing to economic
liberalization and marketization. In the late 1990s, a series of administrative reforms
enabled mass media and social organizations to have greater autonomy and degree of
international linkages. They transformed to become more willing to criticize specific
aspects of policies which could then avoid direct challenges to the central leadership,
such as environmental protection. Under this backdrop, ENGOs and mass media were

297

Li Chelan Linda, Towards a Non-zero-sum Interactive Framework of Spatial Politics: the Case of
Centre-Province in Contemporary China, Political Studies XLV, (1997): 56.

136

willing and able to form coalitions against the construction of the NRP, in addition to
extending the coalitions to include international NGOs.

Applicability of FA Model
Despite leaders‘ domination in both feudal and contemporary Chinese systems,
the vast bureaucratic system has been shown to be complicated and fragmented. In the
system, an organ, and particularly departments at the local level, will be subordinated to
more than one unit. For example, the Civil Affairs Department at the county level is
subordinated to both the county government and the Civil Affairs bureau of the central
and provincial governments. Even the governors from the provincial governments need
to be somewhat administratively accountable to the National People‘s Congress, the
Communist Party Committee in the provinces, and the Central government. This
complicated accountability / relational matrix has made the authority, priority and
directions of policy formulation become more segmented. 298 As a consequence, the
model of Fragmented Authoritarianism suggested by Kenneth Lieberthal, has modified
these relations as kuai and tiao which symbolize the professional relationship of
territorial coordination and leadership relationship of functional bureaucratic branches
amongst the apparatus respectively299. In reality, Lieberthal argued that the priority of
reforms should be given to the horizontal professional relationship rather than the
vertical leadership relationship; a phenomenon known as ‗making tiao to serve kuai‘.300
In the cases of TGP and NRP, the kuai relationship influenced the implementation of the
project. In the chapter 3, the contradiction between the Ministry of Water Conservancy
and the Ministry of Electric Industry in the 1980s was highlighted to illustrate how the
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FA model could be applied in the TGP case. The separation of these two central
ministries uncovered the ‗in-house‘ negotiations in an organ. The Ministry of Water
Conservancy would like to implement the project as soon as possible while the Ministry
of Electric Industry put the project in a lower priority and postponed the schedule of
investigation and negotiations of the project. Hence, the project had not been approved
until the central leadership repressively urged the pace of negotiations. Besides, the
adversary between the SEPA and Yunnan provincial government in the negotiation of
NRP further indicated the segmentation of authority between organs also mentioned in
the chapter 4. These cases are typical illustrations of showing the leverage of kuai
relationship for successful policy formulation. Through the dimension of bargaining
triangle, the rationales and considerations behind the stances of different actors were
generalized and the FA model has been further enriched and amended. Despite the rapid
economic and social change in China since economic reforms, the FA model retained its
high explicability and applicability for the status quos in China.
Mertha added notions to explain the dynamic and strategies of political changes;
the FA model‘s explanation is not as yet complete. However, his contribution is unlikely
to explain the rationales of decision and coalitions, so his addition was criticized to be
‗over-strategic‘ and too optimistic, in merely elaborating on how an emergent civil
society would be more likely to oppose the authorities. Subsequently, this thesis would
like to contribute to this area by demonstrating the transformation of initiatives and
frustration in the policy-making processes of these two specific projects. Through
investigating the rationales of transformation from a multi-perspective approach, more
covered flaws in the bureaucratic systems were disclosed in the analyses. All of these
flaws may somehow influence the policy implementation, and even the legitimacy, of
the CCP. More importantly, these findings were able to be applied to various aspects of
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public policies in China. Thus, more research should be conducted in the future in order
to further extend the explicability of the model. However, rather than illustrating the
circumstances of a specific point in the timeline of Chinese political development, this
thesis aimed to deduce from these circumstances the capabilities of the party and
distribution of power in decision making processes since the economic reforms. It might
be argued that the representativeness seems to be constrained because merely using the
illustration of hydropower development. Thus, the arguments and implications might
thereby be limited. Yet, this thesis has contributed to the enrichment of our study of the
transformation of the political contexts that different players encountered, so as to reveal
the responsiveness of players for the continuous transformation of political contexts in
China.

Further Discussion: Empirical Implications for Chinese Hydroelectricity and
Institutional Development
Findings from the multi-perspective research in this thesis should not be
constrained to reflecting the Chinese political system. They could have further
implications for the institutional development in China, so as to anticipate the prospects
of the Chinese political system. Beyond the institutional aspect, the research findings
could also provide a foundation to discuss hydroelectricity, or even environmental issues,
in China.
Clashes of Interests
In the political sense, this thesis contributed to reveal cleavages of interests
amongst critical actors of the political system in China. Initially, the party leadership
would like to separate economic reform from political ones. The state attempted to adopt
a market mechanism to allow the emergence of private ownership in the Chinese
socialist economy; the political transition to liberal democracy, on the contrary, seemed
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to be limited. This may be due to the fear of chaos and catastrophes in pluralist society.
Hence, the CCP would be prevented from becoming democratized and remain in the
form of consultative authoritarianism301. Nevertheless, this research disclosed a number
of cleavages amongst important actors in the decision making process. Interest
fragmentation did not only exist inside the bureaucratic system, but latent cleavages
were also discovered between society and the authorities. As a consequence, the party
authorities‘ role of ‗representing local interests‘ and ‗representing the fundamental
interests of the majority‘ has been more likely challenged, especially with respect to
provincial cadres. Owing to the extensive diversity among provinces, the central
government relied heavily on provincial leaders to reflect local interests 302 . Zeng
Xiaowei identified that this phenomenon was more popular in the period of economic
reform, as it was chiefly the consequence of the tendency towards recruiting native
people to become provincial leaders in the central government. There were two
advantages to this: (1) the native provincial leaders were equipped with rich knowledge
and understanding of local situations, and this was favourable towards promoting
economic growth in local initiatives; (2) Cross-provincial social mobility was more
unlikely to be available for elite recruitment 303. Subsequently, provincial leaders were
regarded as the representatives of ‗local interests‘ and the most important channel of
bridging the communication gap between localities and central government. Thus, they
were granted greater autonomy and more substantive powers than before.
Nonetheless, this research discovered that the provinces‘ role of representing
local interests may have been reduced. Provincial leaders represented the high
motivations of economic development in the four decades of economic reforms.
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Accordingly, there was a phenomenon known as ‗local developmentalism‘ which
describes the unbalanced emphasis for economic development and industrialization of
provincial leaders, as well as their entrepreneurial metaphors for local economies. Thus,
dam construction projects were highly favored by leaders. However, rapid economic
improvements in previous decades encouraged environmental awareness amongst the
central government and ordinary people 304 . As a result, the political agenda between
provincial leaders and the central government, as well as ordinary people, seemed to
diverge. This flaw was more likely to enlarge due to the direct correlation between local
economic improvement and leaders‘ career promotion. Further, this finding could also
explain why provincial governments and leaders frequently become the target of largescale protests and civilian criticisms, rather than officials in central government.
Implication for Development of Chinese ENGOs
In chapter 5, the Chinese ENGOs were selected for close investigation and it was
concluded that the Chinese ENGOs, different from their Eastern European counterparts,
were unlikely to significantly challenge the authorities. Thus, they were unable to fulfill
their political functions. Nevertheless, the success of the anti-dam campaign, which was
mainly composed by ENGOs, international NGOs and the mass media, was highlighted
when the NRP was discussed. Therefore, how could these ENGOs expand their political
sphere beyond informal coalitions? And, how did these ENGOs maintain their
cohesiveness with their media allies and international counterparts? Hence, the
emergence of NGOs in China most probably enabled the ‗import (of) varied social
interests into the state and, of course, the Party305‘. Yet, to what extent would the CCP
tolerate the NGOs‘ participation? These questions should be further studied as they may
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fundamentally transform the political landscape in China. In the aspect of
hydroelectricity development, Chinese ENGOs are another cluster of players in the
decision making process, and their opposition has transformed the strategy of
development. Thus, instead of constructing gigantic multi-functional dams in the river,
Chinese authorities would like to construct a lot of smaller dams for developing
electricity306. Subsequently, it is unlikely that the Chinese authorities will reduce the
determination of hydroelectricity development. Nevertheless, environmental activists
may probably reduce the development speed of hydropower and pressure the authorities
to stop constructing gigantic dam projects, such as TGP and NRP 307.
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Source: Author‘s Interpretation

Graph 6.1 – Interactional Triangle in the TGP
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Source: Author‘s Interpretation

Graph 6.2 – Interactional Triangle in the NRP
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